Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? by Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
WALL STREET AND MAIN STREET:









University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and NBER.  This research has been supported
by the Center for Research in Security Prices, the Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and
the State, and the Global Financial Markets Initiative.  We are grateful to Emmanuel Saez for useful
discussions and help with tax data.  We thank David Autor, Lucian Bebchuk, Austan Goolsbee, Adam
Looney, Andrew Metrick, Berk Sensoy, Amir Sufi, Robert Topel, Mike Weisbach, and seminar participants
at Berkeley, the Duke-UNC Corporate Finance Conference, Stanford, and the University of Chicago
for helpful discussions and comments.  We thank Sol Garger, Cristina Iftimie, James Wang, Michael
Wong, and Jaclyn Yamada for research assistance. Address correspondence to Steven Kaplan, University
of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL  60637 or e-mail
at skaplan@uchicago.edu. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?
Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh




We consider how much of the top end of the income distribution can be attributed to four sectors --
top executives of non-financial firms (Main Street); financial service sector employees from investment
banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); corporate lawyers; and professional
athletes and celebrities.  Non-financial public company CEOs and top executives do not represent
more than 6.5% of any of the top AGI brackets (the top 0.1%, 0.01%, 0.001%, and 0.0001%).  Individuals
in the Wall Street category comprise at least as high a percentage of the top AGI brackets as non-financial
executives of public companies.  While the representation of top executives in the top AGI brackets
has increased from 1994 to 2004, the representation of Wall Street has likely increased even more.
While the groups we study represent a substantial portion of the top income groups, they miss a large
number of high-earning individuals.  We conclude by considering how our results inform different
explanations for the increased skewness at the top end of the distribution.  We argue the evidence is
most consistent with theories of superstars, skill biased technological change, greater scale and their
interaction.
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It is well known that the income distribution in the United States has become increasing unequal 
over the last two or three decades.
1  The sources of this increased inequality, however, are not completely 
understood, particularly at the very top end of the distribution.  In this paper, we consider in detail how 
much of the inequality today at the top end of the income distribution can be attributed to four different 
sectors of the economy – top executives of non-financial firms (Main Street); financial service sector 
employees from investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); 
lawyers; and professional athletes and celebrities. 
Where possible, we estimate how those contributions have varied over time.  It is well-known and 
well-documented that top executive pay has increased substantially over the last twenty-five years (Hall 
and Liebman (1998), Hall and Murphy (2003), Jensen et al (2004), Bebchuk and Fried (2004 and 2006)).  
Those increases have generated a great deal of controversy and attention.   At the same time, the financial 
and legal sectors also have experienced substantial growth over the last twenty-five years both in number 
of employees and the pay of those employees.  As a result, those sectors also include many high income 
individuals.  Unlike data on the top executives of public companies, however, compensation on 
investment bankers, hedge fund employees, private equity partners, and law firm partners are not 
disclosed systematically.   
We begin with the data in ExecuComp on compensation for top executives of public companies.  
We use two measures of compensation.  First, we consider realized or actual compensation that includes 
options exercised during the year.  While realized compensation estimates the compensation an executive 
will recognize on his or her income tax return for one year, it may represent option grants from more or 
less than one past year.  Since income from stock options is taxed upon exercise, this provides a 
reasonable measure of the employment-related compensation the executive actually reports to the IRS 
that year.  Second, we consider ex ante or estimated compensation that uses the estimated value of options 
                                                           
1 See Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) and (2006), Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005), Piketty and Saez (2003), 
(2006a), and (2006b).     2
granted that year rather than the value of options exercised.  This provides a better measure of the 
compensation the board expected to give the CEO that year and clearly represents just one year of 
compensation. 
We extrapolate the data on those companies to also include non-ExecuComp companies.  We 
estimate the contribution of all top executives from non-financial and financial firms to the top ends of the 
distributions of adjusted gross income (AGI) from the IRS, both recently and for 1994.  We consider both 
total AGI and AGI excluding investment income. 
We estimate that non-financial executives represent 5.25% of the top 0.01% bracket of AGI in 
2004 using realized compensation.  Using ex ante compensation, the non-financial executives represent 
only 3.9% of the top 0.01% bracket.  In both cases, top executives explain only a modest fraction of the 
top 0.01% bracket.  The results are similar for the top 0.001% and 0.0001% brackets. 
At the same time, we find that non-financial executives represent 3.9% of the top 0.01% bracket 
of AGI in 1994 using realized compensation, and 3.65% using ex ante compensation.  Non-financial 
executives, therefore, represent a modestly larger fraction of the very top brackets using realized 
compensation, and virtually the same fraction using ex ante compensation.  While top executive pay 
increased substantially over the ten-year period, the increase in pay appears to explain only a modest 
fraction of the increase in the top end of the AGI distribution using actual pay.  Furthermore, on an ex 
ante or expected basis the pay of top executives did not increase more quickly than that of other highly 
paid individuals. 
We then use the financial statements of publicly-traded investment banking firms (e.g., Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley), and calibrated assumptions of the distribution of compensation within those 
firms, to estimate the distribution of the most highly compensated people (whom we refer to as managing 
directors) at those firms.  We estimate that the managing directors and top executives of the top 
investment banking firms comprise a larger percentage of those individuals in the top 0.01% (but a 
smaller percentage in the top 0.001%) than the top executives of non-financial public companies.   3
Next, we attempt to estimate incomes for individuals in the asset management business.  We look 
at hedge fund, venture capital (VC) fund, private equity or buyout (PE) fund and mutual fund investors.  
The data here are admittedly very coarse and we make a number of assumptions to obtain estimates of 
income.  A large number of professionals in these areas are highly compensated.  For example, we 
estimate that the professionals in hedge funds, VC funds, and PE funds include roughly the same number 
of individuals in the top 0.1% of the AGI income distribution as the top non-financial executives.  While 
it is very difficult to estimate precise distributional changes over time for this sector, we also provide 
evidence that these industries are significantly larger today than 10 and 20 years ago and therefore that 
their employees must represent a much larger fraction of top quantiles than they did previously. 
We also find that hedge fund investors and other “Wall Street” type individuals comprise a larger 
fraction of the very highest end of the AGI distribution (the top 0.0001%) than CEOs and top executives.  
In 2004, nine times as many Wall Street investors earned in excess of $100 million as public company 
CEOs.  In fact, the top 25 hedge fund managers combined appear to have earned more than all 500 S&P 
500 CEOs combined (both realized and estimated). 
We then examine lawyers using profit per partner for the top 50, 100, and 200 law firms in the 
United States.  The average profit per partner in 2004 in the top 100 firms is $1.0 million, representing 
almost 18,000 partners.  This compares to an average profit per partner of $0.45 million in 1994 
representing 13,000 partners.  Profits per partner, therefore, have increased by a factor of almost 2.2 times 
while the number of partners has increased by more than 40%.  In real terms, profits per partner have 
increased by almost 2 times.  Similarly, we estimate that the fraction of lawyers in the top 0.5% and 0.1% 
AGI brackets increased substantially from 1994 to 2004 (as well as from 1984 to 1994).  For example, we 
estimate that partners of the top 100 law firms represent 2.4% of the top 0.1% AGI bracket in 2004, 
compared to 1.3% in 1994.   
Finally, we investigate professional athletes in basketball, baseball, and football.  These athletes 
represent a similar percentage of the top 0.1% AGI bracket in 2004 as in 1994 (0.8% both years), but a 
larger percentage of the top 0.01% AGI bracket (1.5% versus 1.0%).  Data on celebrities are not as   4
complete as data on professional athletes but suggest that celebrities comprise a substantially smaller 
share of the top fractiles.   
Overall, we estimate that the groups we study represent 15% to 26.5% of the individuals who 
comprise the AGI categories at and above the top 0.1%.  Among the groups we study, non-financial 
public company CEOs and top executives are estimated relatively precisely and represent 2.0% to 6.4% 
of the very top AGI brackets.  In every top AGI bracket, we estimate that Wall Street-related individuals 
comprise a greater percentage of the top AGI brackets than non-financial executives of public companies. 
When we exclude investment income from AGI, the groups we study represent 22% to 33% of 
the individuals in the very top AGI brackets.  Non-financial executives do not represent more than 12% of 
any of the top AGI brackets excluding investment income. 
While our estimates represent a substantial portion of the top income groups, they clearly miss a 
large number of high-earning individuals.  We suspect that some of the missing individuals are trial 
lawyers, executives of privately-held companies, highly paid doctors, and independently wealthy 
individuals who have a high AGI.  While some of the missing individuals may also be non-top five 
executives of publicly-traded companies, the pay of the fifth highest paid executives suggests that this 
number is negligible for the top 0.01% and above. 
From 1994 to 2004, the representation of top executives of non-financial firms in the top brackets 
increased using realized pay, but was virtually the same using and using ex ante pay.  The contribution of 
lawyers, hedge fund managers, private equity and venture capital professionals to the top brackets 
unequivocally increased over this period, and almost certainly to a greater extent than top executives. 
We conclude by considering how our results inform different explanations for the increased 
skewness at the top end of the distribution.  These explanations include trade theories (Hecksher (1931), 
Olin (1933), Stolper and Samuelson (1941)), increasing returns to generalists rather than specialists 
(Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Frydman (2005)), stealing theories (Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and 
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005)), social norms (Piketty and Saez (2006a) and Levy and Temin (2007)), 
greater scale (Gabaix and Landier (2006)), skill biased technological change (Katz and Murphy (1992),   5
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Garicano and Hubbard (2007)), and the economics of superstars 
(Rosen (1981). 
It seems unlikely that trade theories can account for the massive observed increase in inequality at 
the highest levels of the income distribution, especially given the breadth of this phenomenon and the fact 
that it does not affect only the groups for which the products and services are heavily and increasingly 
exported or bid for by tradable sectors.  For example, an increase in open trade cannot be the primary 
factor driving the substantial increase in the pay of U.S. lawyers, given that most of their human capital is 
country-specific. 
It also seems unlikely that our evidence can be reconciled with the theory of increasing returns to 
generalists.  It is difficult to argue that lawyers, hedge fund investors, investment bankers, and 
professional athletes have become less specialized / more general over time.  In fact, the opposite seems 
more likely to be true.   
While we do not test directly whether any group of individuals is stealing or not, we do not find 
that the top brackets are dominated by CEOs and top executives who arguably have the greatest influence 
over their own pay.  In fact, on an ex ante basis, we find that the representation of CEOs and top 
executives in the top brackets has remained constant since 1994.  Our evidence, therefore, suggests that 
poor corporate governance or managerial power over shareholders cannot be more than a small part of the 
picture of increasing income inequality, even at the very upper end of the distribution.  We also discuss 
the claim that CEOs and top executives are not paid for performance relative to other groups.  Contrary to 
this claim, we find that realized CEO pay is highly related to firm industry-adjusted stock performance 
Our evidence also is hard to reconcile with the arguments in Piketty and Saez (2006a) and Levy 
and Temin (2007) that the increase in pay at the top is driven by the recent removal of social norms 
regarding pay inequality.  Levy and Temin (2007) emphasize the importance of Federal government 
policies towards unions, income taxation and the minimum wage.  While top executive pay has increased, 
so has the pay of other groups, particularly Wall Street groups, who are and have been less subject to 
disclosure and social norms over a long period of time.  In addition, the compensation arrangements at   6
hedge funds, VC funds, and PE funds have not changed much, if at all, in the last twenty-five or thirty 
years (see Sahlman (1990) and Metrick and Yasuda (2007)).  Furthermore, it is not clear how greater 
unionization would have suppressed the pay of those on Wall Street.  In other words, there is no evidence 
of a change in social norms on Wall Street.  What has changed is the amount of money managed and the 
concomitant amount of pay. 
Given what we think our evidence does not support, we believe that the evidence remains 
consistent with theories of skill biased technological change, superstars, greater scale and their 
interaction.  With the huge improvements in information technology and the substantial increase in value 
of the securities markets over the last twenty-five years, asset managers, investment bankers, lawyers, and 
top executives can now apply their talent to much larger pools of money.   
Our analysis is most closely related to the second half of Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005).  They 
consider two possible sources of increasing income inequality – the pay of top executives and the pay of 
entertainment and sports superstars.  Based on average pay statistics, they claim that those two groups 
account for most of the income earned in the very top quantiles of the income distribution.  There are 
several ways in which our analysis is different from theirs.  First, Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) 
interpret the mean statistics from Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) rather than analyze the distribution of pay 
we do.  In doing so, they assume that each executive earns the average amount of pay which clearly 
ignores the true distribution.  Second, they do not consider non-ExecuComp firms.  Finally, they do not 
measure Wall Street-type professionals or lawyers at all.  In his discussion of Dew-Becker and Gordon 
(2005), Topel (2005) raises several of these issues. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II analyzes data from ExecuComp on incomes of top 
executives in non-financial and financial firms and their contribution to the income distribution.  Section 
III focuses on other employees in the financial services and investment sector.  Section IV reports our 
results on lawyers.  Section V reports our results on professional athletes.  In section VI, we use the 
results in the previous sections to see how much of the top end those groups explain.  Section VII   7
discusses the extent to which the different groups are paid for performance.  In section VIII, we discuss 
the implications of our results on different theories of increased income inequality. 
 
 
II.  Top Executives (Main Street) 
In this section, we consider the contribution of top executives of public companies in the U.S. to 
the top end of the income distribution.  We begin with the top executives in the ExecuComp database.  
ExecuComp covers the compensation of top executives of the companies in the S&P 500, the S&P 
Midcap 400, and the S&P Smallcap 600, plus some companies that were in those indices in previous 
years.  In this analysis, we focus on the year 2004 because it is the most recent for which complete data 
are available, and 1994 because it is the first year that ExecuComp has full coverage of the index 
companies.  For the year 1994, ExecuComp covered 1,747 total companies, and for 2004 it covered 1,722 
total companies. 
ExecuComp reports two summary measures of compensation, TDC1 and TDC2.  TDC2 estimates 
the value of total compensation realized by the executive in a given year.  This is the sum of salary, 
bonus, the value of restricted stock granted, the net value of stock options exercised and the value of long-
term incentive payouts.  TDC2 also will reflect any benefit that an executive may have received from 
backdating options.  TDC2 will be closer to the amount reported as income on an executive’s tax return.  
Because executives typically exercise options granted in previous years, TDC2 may represent 
compensation from more than one (or less than one) year.   
TDC1 estimates the value of total compensation awarded (but not necessarily realized) to the 
executive that year.  This equals TDC2 but replaces the net value of stock options exercised with the 
estimated value of stock options granted, using a Black-Scholes calculation.  TDC1 does not reflect 
option backdating benefits because it assumes that the stock price on the issue date was the same as the 
exercise price.   8
Reported taxable income may differ from TDC2 because some restricted stock grants are not 
taxable until they vest.  In any given year, an executive’s true taxable income will reflect the restricted 
stock grants that vested that year which will include some current year as well as past year grants.   
Reported AGI also will differ from TDC2 to the extent that executives earn income from other 
sources, such as directorships of other companies, or interest, dividend, and capital gains income.  To 
control for this, we also consider AGI brackets that exclude investment income and reach qualitatively 
similar conclusions.  Other deferred compensation, such as pension benefits, also will not appear in TDC2 
or TDC1 nor would they appear in AGI.
2  An additional caveat when looking at AGI comparisons is that 
AGI is calculated at the level of the tax filing unit, whereas we consider individuals.  In other words, we 
essentially assume that none of the individuals in our paper are married to each other or to other high 
earners.  While not precisely true, we do not believe this is a large source of bias in our estimates. 
To summarize, TDC2 will be closer to an executive’s true AGI while TDC1 will more closely 
approximate the compensation a company’s board expected to pay the executive. 
We also assume that all of the top executives are U.S. citizens and report all of their income to the 
U.S. tax authorities.  Because some top executives are not U.S. citizens or are taxed elsewhere, our results 
will overstate the number of executives that actually appear in the relevant tax brackets. 
For 1994 and 2004, we report the number of top executives in each AGI income bracket based on 
TDC2 and TDC1.  We restrict our sample in several additional ways.  First, we remove any duplicated 
observations for a given individual.  Second, we restrict attention to only the top five most highly 
compensated executives per firm.  ExecuComp typically takes as many executives as happen to be in the 
disclosure statements, which may be more than the legally required 5.  The average number of unique 
executive names per firm-year in Execucomp was 6.7 in 1994 and declined to 5.9 in 2004.  As we do not 
want our results affected by changing coverage, we keep only the largest 5 TDC2 observations for each 
firm-year.  Finally, for executives who appear in the top 5 at multiple firms within a given year (perhaps 
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for Fortune 500 CEOs from 1996 to 2002.   9
because they started the year at one  firm and ended the year at another), we sum the TDC2 they earned at 
each firm to convert these multiple observations into one observation. 
While most ExecuComp companies are non-financial companies, some, like Goldman Sachs, are 
financial services companies, such as banks and investment banks.  Accordingly, we divide the 
ExecuComp executives into non-financial and financial executives.  Financial executives are executives 
of firms that have an SIC code from 6000 to 6299.  We consider firms with SIC codes at 6300 and above 
to be non-financials; these firms include insurance companies and real estate agents and operators.  We 
classify them as non-financials because they are generally not “Wall Street” type firms.  Financial firms 
comprised 42 of the S&P 500, 30 of the S&P Midcap 400, and 55 of the S&P Smallcap 600 in 1994 and 
47 of the S&P 500, 33 of the S&P Midcap 400, and 32 of the S&P Smallcap 600 in 2004. 
Table 1a reports the number of non-financial and financial ExecuComp executives in each AGI 
bracket.  The cutoffs for the top fractiles of AGI income in 1994 are calculated based on the detailed IRS 
Statistics of Income files for US individuals, held at the NBER.  The cutoffs for the top fractiles of AGI 
income in 2004 are calculated based on the 2002 distribution (the latest years for which the detailed files 
are available) and the relation between the 2002 and 2004 fractiles documented in the tabulations of 
Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006).    
Table 1a shows that from 1994 to 2004, CEO and top executive compensation increased 
substantially.  For the top five non-financial ExecuComp executives, the average nominal realized 
compensation (TDC2) increased from $0.91 million in 1994 to $2.82 million in 2004.  For financial 
executives, the increase was from $1.32 million to $4.54 million.   
Using realized compensation, the table shows that non-financial ExecuComp executives represent 
a somewhat larger fraction of the top AGI brackets in 2004 than they did in 1994.  The increase is small 
in the top 0.1%, but larger in the brackets above.  For example, non-financial ExecuComp executives 
represented 2.25% of the top 0.1% in 1994 and 2.58% in 2004.  At the same time, for the top 0.01%, they 
represented 2.56% in 1994, but 4.46% in 2004; for the top 0.001%, 1.90% in 1994, and 5.06% in 2004.    10
While the top executive share of the very top brackets has increased, the top executives comprise a 
modest fraction of those brackets. 
Using ex ante or estimated compensation, the picture is quite different.  the table shows that non-
financial ExecuComp executives occupy roughly the same fraction of the top brackets in 2004 as they did 
in 1994 except for the very top where their share actually declines.  For example, non-financial 
ExecuComp executives represent 3.65% of the top 0.01% in 1994 and 3.54% in 2004.  At the same time, 
they represent 2.50% of the top 0.001% in 1994, but only 1.74% in 2004. 
For comparison with other studies, table 1b shows the results for ExecuComp CEOs only.  The 
results are qualitatively similar to those for all top executives.  CEOs have maintained or increased their 
share of the top brackets using realized compensation, and have more or less maintained their share using 
ex ante or estimated compensation.  
Tables 1a and 1b show the fraction of financial executives in the top brackets also increase using 
realized pay, but remain roughly the same using estimated pay.  According to Table 1a, financial 
executives comprise 0.57% of the AGIs in the top 0.01% in 1994 compared to 0.77% of the AGIs in 2004 
using realized pay.  Using estimated pay, financial executives comprise 0.80% of the top 0.01% in 1994 
and 0.62% in 2004. 
While the ExecuComp data cover over 1,600 publicly-traded companies, there were a total of 
8,060 publicly traded companies in 2004 for which equity market values are available in Compustat.  
Accordingly, we estimate the compensation of top executives in the non-ExecuComp companies.  We 
sample proxy statements to measure compensation for up to 50 non-ExecuComp companies in each of 
three size brackets.  We do this because the non-ExecuComp companies are small relative to the 
ExecuComp companies and compensation tends to be lower in smaller companies (see Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005) or Gabaix and Landier (2006)).   
We use three size brackets that are analogous to those in the ExecuComp data.  We assume that if 
a firm's equity market value exceeds the maximum equity market value for S&P400 Midcap firms, it is 
like an S&P500 firm.  We identify fewer than 50 such firms.  The second group includes firms with   11
equity market values above $1 billion but below the maximum for S&P 400 Midcap firms.  The third 
group includes firms with equity market values below $1 billion, but above the minimum equity market 
value for the S&P600 Smallcap firms.  We exclude firms with market values below the minimum for the 
S&P 600 Smallcap, assuming that these companies have virtually no very high paid executives.  
Table 1c assumes that top executive compensation in the non-ExecuComp firms in each size class 
mirrors the top executive compensation of the firms that we sampled in each size class.  Table 1c 
indicates that there are relatively few very highly paid executives in non-ExecuComp firms.  The table 
also shows that top executives in non-financial non-ExecuComp firms comprise a lower fraction of the 
top 0.01% of AGI brackets in 2004 than they do in 1994 – 0.79% versus 1.34% – but a higher fraction of 
the top 0.001% – 1.34% versus 0 – using realized compensation.  The top executives occupy a higher 
fraction of the very top brackets using ex ante or estimate compensation.  In all cases, however, the 
magnitudes are quite modest, never exceeding 1.36% of any bracket. 
Table 1c also combines the estimates for ExecuComp and non-Execucomp non-financial 
executives.  Using realized compensation, non-financial executives overall occupied 5.25% of the top 
0.01% and 6.4% of the top 0.001% in 2004 compared to 3.9% and 1.9%, respectively, in 1994.  Using 
estimated compensation, non-financial executives overall occupied 3.9% of the top 0.01% and 1.9% of 
top 0.001% in 2004 compared to 3.65% and 2.5% in 1994. 
Table 1d repeats the analyses in tables 1a and 1c for non-financial executives, but uses AGI 
brackets that exclude investment income including dividends, interest, rentals, farm income, IRA 
distributions, income from estates and trusts, pension and annuity distributions, long term capital gains, 
and Form 4797 income.  This increases the percentage of the brackets occupied by the top executives.  
Using realized income, table 1d indicates that top executives of all non-financial firms comprise 8.55% of 
the top 0.01% in 2004 versus 6.07% in 1994.  For the top 0.001%, the top executives comprise 11.87% in 
2004 versus 3.97% in 1994.  Using estimated income, table 1d indicates that top executives of all non-
financial firms comprise 7.28% of the top 0.01% in 2004 versus 6.18% in 1994.  For the top 0.001%, the 
top executives comprise 5.90% in 2004 versus 5.35% in 1994.   12
Overall, the analyses of top executives show two main patterns.  First, using estimated or ex ante 
pay the share of non-financial top executives’ share of the very top AGI brackets is small and has 
remained roughly the same since 1994.  Second, using realized pay, the share of non-financial top 
executives in the top 0.01% has increased modestly, but has increased more substantially at the very top – 
in the top 0.001%.  
It is worth ending with one additional point.  It is possible that we leave out a large number of 
high earners by restricting the sample to the top 5 executives.  To assess whether this is true, we look at 
the pay of the fifth highest paid executive (assuming that all others are below this level).  The results in 
table 1e suggest that including non-top 5 executives would not affect our basic results at all at brackets at 
the top 0.01% and above.   In 2004, table 1e shows that only 7 non-financial ExecuComp executives are 
in the top 0.01% bracket using realized pay and only 14 are in that bracket using estimated pay.  The 
corresponding numbers in 1994 are 5 and 18.  These represent at most 0.17% of their respective brackets.  
They also represent similar percentages in 2004 and 1994. 
 
III. Wall  Street 
  A. Investment  Banking 
It is well-known that investment banking and other financial services firms have a large number 
of highly compensated individuals.  Because firms are not required to disclose individual compensation 
for these individuals, it is not clear how large the amounts are and how many individuals earn them.  
Investment banks typically report only a very small amount of information about the compensation of 
their employees, generally limited to a figure for total global employee compensation plus the usual 
figures for compensation of the top five corporate executives.  These disclosures likely obscure the fact 
that there are many highly paid professionals at the firm who are not among the top five employees.  
Indeed, the typical managing director at a top Wall Street firm will almost never earn less than $500,000 a 
year in total compensation, and there are thousands of these individuals.   13
In this section, we attempt to estimate the number of highly paid professionals at Wall Street 
securities firms, as well as their distribution of pay, and examine how this number and distribution 
compare to the statistics on executives of publicly traded companies.  We use publicly available 
information on total compensation from the top 10 publicly-traded investment banks.   Based on 
discussions with industry insiders, we create a distribution of income for these firms.  We then attempt to 
extrapolate from that information to other firms. 
 
1. Counting the Managing Directors 
We use the title managing director to describe the top echelon of securities firm professionals and 
begin with a detailed study of ten of the top eleven securities firms from the list of the top 100 securities 
firms by Institutional Investor (2004).  Institutional Investor organizes this list by total consolidated 
capital of the securities unit of the firms in question; the ten we study comprise roughly 90% of the total 
consolidated capital of the top 100.  These firms are listed in Table 2a.  We exclude Bank of America 
Securities from our top 10 because of data availability issues, and instead include number 11, J.P. Morgan 
Securities. 
There are several complications that we attempt to address in this analysis.  First, several of the 
top 10 are divisions of conglomerates that include both investment and commercial banks.  We focus on 
only the securities businesses of these firms, including asset and wealth management but excluding 
commercial banking.  While some firms report disaggregated segment level information on total number 
of employees, many do not.  Where necessary, we use the ratio of segment net revenue to total net 
revenue to derive an estimate of segment employees.  Second, while some securities firms report the 
number of managing directors, many do not.  In these cases we either rely on industry sources that 
estimate this figure or estimate the number of global managing directors as a fraction of global 
employees.  When we apply ratios, we typically use figures between 3 and 4 percent, calibrating in many 
cases to information from industry insiders.  Third, while some firms report U.S. information separately 
from global information, in many cases we needed to estimate the number of U.S. employees.  Where   14
necessary, we use the ratio of U.S. to global net revenues to estimate this figure.  Finally, we generally 
assume that the ratio of U.S. to global employees is indicative of the ratio of U.S. to global revenues. 
Table 2a presents our assessment of the likely number of U.S. managing directors at these ten 
firms.  Non-italicized figures are numbers taken directly from the financial reports of the companies in 
question or calculated as ratios of figures taken directly from the reports.  Italicized figures represent our 
imputations, in which we have attempted to be as conservative as possible.   
We use relatively straightforward calculations to estimate the managing directors at Goldman 
Sachs Group and Bear Stearns Companies.  The 2004 Goldman Sachs annual report lists the number of 
managing directors at 1,181.  The annual report also lists 20,722 global employees with 13,278 based in 
the U.S. for a ratio of 64%.  We apply this ratio to the number of managing directors to derive an estimate 
of 757 managing directors based in the U.S.  For Bear Stearns, although the company does not list its 
managing directors, industry insiders revealed approximately 850 global managing directors.  
Furthermore, while this firm does not detail the U.S. versus non-U.S. employee breakdown, 91% of Bear 
Stearns revenues originate in the U.S.  We therefore estimate that Bear Stearns had 770 (91% of 850) 
managing directors based in the U.S. in 2004.  Both Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns are essentially pure 
investment banks, so there are no complications involved with deriving segment-level estimates.   
Lehman Brothers also provides a relatively straightforward case.  The annual report lists 19,600 
global employees with 14,100 based in the U.S.  Unfortunately, we do not know the number of managing 
directors at this firm.  We assume a conservative 4% (compared to the implied figures of 6% for Goldman 
Sachs and 8% for Bear Stearns), calibrated from conversations with industry insiders.  This leads to a 
figure of 564 managing directors based in the U.S. in 2004. 
Morgan Stanley is an example of a firm that engages in other non-securities related activities, 
including Discover credit cards and retail brokerage.  The annual report provides the number of total 
employees and the number of managing directors for the firm.  We estimate the number of employees in 
each segment by applying the ratio of segment to total net revenues to the number of global employees.  
For example, we estimate that the institutional securities division has 29,472 employees, which is 53,284   15
times the ratio of $13,313 to $23,708.  We assume that all the managing directors come from the 
institutional securities and asset management divisions.  This implies that 3% of the employees in those 
divisions are managing directors, still very low relative to Lehman, Goldman, and Bear Stearns.  We 
estimate U.S. employment as the ratio of U.S. to total net revenue, which we assume is roughly constant 
across segments of the firm.  These calculations yield 780 managing directors at Morgan Stanley. 
Proceeding in this fashion for the remaining investment banks, we count 6,006 managing 
directors based in the U.S. working for these ten firms.  We believe that this number is conservative.  
Private conversations with industry participants suggest that we underestimate the highly paid investment 
bankers at some of these firms.  We also estimate that adding the rest of the U.S. investment banking 
sector would raise this figure by a considerable, but unknown amount.  In our analysis, we report the 
income distribution per 10,000 managing directors.  We believe this is a reasonable guess as to the total 
number of managing directors or employees receiving managing director type pay.  In any investment 
bank, there will be a number of highly paid employees who are not yet managing directors.   If one 
wanted to be conservative, we think 7,000 managing directors would represent a minimum.   
 
2. Estimating the Distribution of Pay 
According to industry sources, it is rare for a managing director at a top Wall Street firm to 
receive compensation of less than $500,000 during the period we are studying.  Furthermore, we 
understand that at least one quarter of managing directors earn in excess of $2.5 million per year.
 3    
Based on this information, we consider two possible distributions of pay.  The first is a pareto distribution 
with a minimum value of $500,000, which we truncate at $35 million, as this is approximately the top 
value observed for any investment banking employee.  
The cumulative distribution function of the pareto distribution takes the form:   
                                                           
3 Our estimates are based on conversations with industry sources.  For confirmation, see Lisa Kasenaar, The 
International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2006 who reports that the Options Group, an executive-search company, 
estimated that “managing directors may get an average bonus of about $2.25 million in coming weeks” in 2005; as 
well as Duff McDonald’s “Please, Sir, I Want Some More. How Goldman Sachs is carving up its $11 billion money 












where xm is the minimum value of $500,000 and we estimate k = 0.8613 based on the restriction that 25% 
of the distribution earns more than $2.5 million.  This distribution yields estimates that are more 
conservative at the bottom of the distribution than would be accepted by most industry insiders, with 
almost half of the managing directors earning less than $1 million. 
  The second distribution is an exponential distribution, which we censor below at $500,000.  The 
cumulative distribution function of the exponential distribution takes the form: 
      () 1
x PX x e
β − >= −  
where we estimate β = 0.00055 based on the restriction that 25% of the distribution earns more than $2.5 
million.  This distribution is more liberal at the upper end of the distribution than the truncated pareto, 
though it is more conservative at the very top.  The censored exponential distribution allows only 0.1% of 
managing directors to earn more than $20 million, compared to 0.3% as given by the truncated pareto 
distribution. 
It is our understanding that most of the pay estimated here will show up in AGI for the managing 
directors.  Most of the investment banks are public companies and C corporations.  The MDs of these 
firms will receive taxable income.  MDs of private firms may receive K-1 or partnership income.  It is our 
understanding that the majority of income and bonus that MDs receive is in the form of cash.  This will 
appear in AGI in the year it is received.  For many investment banks, MDs receive some fraction of 
compensation as restricted stock and options or defer some compensation.  For this compensation, there 
will be a timing difference between our estimates and actual AGI.  For example, restricted stock will 
appear as income when it vests and option gains will appear when the options are exercised. 
  Table 2b reports the estimated distributions of pay for 10,000 managing directors alongside the 
AGI brackets.  The first vertical panel presents the percentage of managing directors in each AGI bracket.  
The Pareto distribution implies that 60% of the MDs earn less than $1.4 million (the top 0.1% threshold) 
while the exponential distribution implies that number is 31%.  The average MD earns $1.9 million   17
(Pareto) and $2.8 million (exponential).  Based on conversations with industry insiders, we believe the 
exponential distribution is somewhat more realistic.   
The second vertical panel presents the percent of each bracket accounted for by every 10,000 
managing directors, and the third panel presents the number of individuals earning at least the minimum 
bracket amount for every 10,000 managing directors.  As noted above, we believe that 10,000 managing 
directors is a reasonable estimate for Wall Street as a whole.   
Using our assumptions, we estimate that the 10,000 top-tier managing directors at investment 
banks generate enough AGI to explain at least 5.8% (Pareto) or 11.2% (exponential) of the top 0.01% of 
the AGI distribution.  These are at least as large as our estimates for all top non-financial executives of 
5.25% using realized compensation and 3.9% using ex ante compensation.  The MDs explain a lower 
fraction of the top 0.001%. 
We also estimate that the MDs earn a total of $19 billion (Pareto) to $28 billion (exponential).  
This is slightly lower, but the same order of magnitude as our estimate of $34 billion (realized) and $27 
billion (ex ante) for all top non-financial executives. 
Overall, then, investment bankers appear to explain roughly the same amount of the top end of 
the income distribution as top executives of non-financial firms. 
 
  3.  Historical Wall Street. 
It seems likely that the number of managing directors on Wall Street and their compensation have 
increased substantially in the last 20 or 30 years.  Unfortunately, data availability concerns make it 
difficult if not impossible to repeat our 2004 analysis for earlier periods.  We can, however, get a sense of 
the growth in Wall Street by compare the number of employees and capital employed at Wall Street firms 
over time.  The Securities Industry Association (SIA) provides a list of the top 50 securities firms each 
year.  We collected the 2004 list as well as the 1987 list (the furthest back we could find).  We also 
obtained the list of the top 50 securities firms in 1972 provided by the Investment Banker-Broker 
Almanac.     18
Table 2c reports the total number of global employees and the total global capital employed at the 
top 50 U.S. securities firms in 1972, 1987, and 2004.  Employment increased by 170% from 1972 to 1987 
and, by 79% from 1987 to 2004.  Capital employed by those employees increased exponentially by more 
than ten times from 1972 to 1987, and by more than twenty times from 1987 to 2004.  Capital per 
employee, therefore, increased substantially as well, from $34 thousand ($124 thousand in $2004) in 1972  
to $136 thousand ($203 thousand) in 1994 to $1,789 thousand in 2004.  This represents a remarkable 
increase in capital per employee, particularly since 1994.   
Similarly, Morrison and Wilhelm (2007) present evidence concerning investment banks in the 
1960s and 1970s.  In 1970, their tabulations indicate that the top twenty-three investment banks have a 
total of fewer than 1,600 partners and average capital per partner of less than $0.75 million.  This would 
represent $3 million of capital per partner in 2004 dollars.  Assuming that the firms in table 2c have 
10,000 managing directors, table 2c implies almost $70 million of capital per managing director, a 23 fold 
increase relative to 1970. 
 
B.  Alternative Assets 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a large increase in the amount of money allocated by 
institutional investors and wealthy individuals to alternative asset classes.  The most prominent members 
of the alternative asset classes are hedge funds, venture capital (VC) funds, and private equity (PE) or 
buyout funds.  These funds are of interest for compensation and the income distribution because the 
hedge fund, VC and PE fund investors potentially receive substantial compensation.   
The fees typically paid to the alternative asset fund – whether hedge, VC or PE fund – consists of 
a management fee that equals a percentage of total or committed capital and a profit share or carried 
interest of the profits of the fund (after paying the management fees).  The typical compensation for hedge 
funds today is 2 / 20, i.e., 2% management fee and 20% of the profits on total capital although the top 
performing hedge funds charge more.  This also is typical for VC and PE funds based on committed 
capital.  It is typical for the larger PE funds to reduce the management fee to 1½% of committed capital   19
while smaller VC funds increase the management fee to 2½%.
4    In this section, we attempt to estimate 
the amount of fees paid to the managers of alternative assets, how those fees have increased over time, 
and the effect of those fees on the income distribution. 
 
1.  Hedge Funds 
  It is well known that hedge funds have experienced a large increase in assets under management 
in the last twenty years.  Table 3a provides time series of hedge fund assets from three different databases, 
Hennessee Group, Hedge Fund Research, and TASS.  All three confirm the large increase in hedge fund 
assets from less than $50 billion in 1990 to roughly $1 trillion by the end of 2005.   
The last three columns of table 3a use the Hennessee Group assets under management, realized 
(net) hedge fund returns and the typical compensation of 2% / 20% to estimate the fees earned by hedge 
fund managers.  The management fees are estimated by multiplying the assets under management at the 
beginning of the year (end of previous year) by 2%.  The profit share or carry is estimated by multiplying 
the average return for the year if it is positive by the beginning of year assets under management to get net 
profit.  Because net profit is after carry, we gross up the net profit by dividing by 80% to get the gross 
profit for the year.  We then take 20% of the gross profit as the estimate of the profit share.  Total fees are 
the sum of management fees and carried interest.  Table 3a estimates that hedge fund fees have increased 
from less than $0.5 billion in 1987 to less than $2 billion in 1994 to $17.5 billion in 2004 and $20.5 
billion in 2005. 
This calculation almost certainly understates compensation because it assumes that all hedge 
funds earn the average return for the year.  Because the 20% profit share is applied only to positive 
returns (and not negative returns) any appreciable dispersion across funds such that some funds earn 
negative returns (but not negative carry) implies that the actual profit share exceeds the estimates above.  
In other words, the profit share acts like a call option.   
                                                           
4 See Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Metrick and Yasuda (2007).   20
Malkiel (2005) reports a standard deviation of 11% on the Van Global Hedge Fund index.  Chany 
et al. (2005) report a standard deviation of 8.25% on the CSFB / Tremont hedge fund index.  They report 
mean annualized standard deviations across a sample of over 4,000 individual hedge funds that exceeds 
14%.  If we conservatively assume a standard deviation of 11% and risk free rate of 3%, using Black-
Scholes, a one year call option is worth almost 6% (with a 14% standard deviation, roughly 7%).  The 
20% profit share is 20% of a call option on an entire fund.  This implies that the profit share has an 
expected annual cost of 1.2% at the 11% standard deviation.  Under the assumption of 11% standard 
deviation of hedge fund returns, the expected fees on a 2 / 20 hedge fund are roughly 3.2%.  The last 
column of table 3a calculates fees on this basis, and figure 1 depicts the results.  The estimated fees for 
2004 increase from $17.5 under the simple method to over $25.4 billion.  Obviously, the estimate would 
be higher under higher volatility assumptions.  Interestingly, the $25.4 billion figure is the same order of 
magnitude as the total pay to non-financial top executives and to investment banking MDs. 
It is clear there has been a large increase in fees going to hedge funds.  There is no doubt that 
much of this increase shows up as compensation to the owners of the hedge funds and the people they 
hire.
5  It is difficult to know exactly how much.  In what follows, we provide some rough estimates. 
We begin with the list of the top 100 hedge fund firms in Institutional Investor (II) in 2005 which 
measures assets as of the end of 2004.  According to II, these hedge funds managed $568 billion.  Of the 
100 firms, 79 are listed as U.S. companies with $459 billion under management.  We searched the SEC 
Investment Advisor Public Disclosure database for information on these funds.  Forty-six of these funds 
provided information to the SEC.  These funds are listed by II as having $268 billion of hedge fund 
money under management. 
The funds reporting to the SEC must list a range of the number of the total number of employees 
as well as the number of employees who are investment advisory.  On average, the forty-six funds list a 
minimum of 89 and a maximum of 255 employees as well as a minimum of 26 and a maximum of 109 
                                                           
5 Hedge funds may be organized as partnerships in which some of the carried interest is taxed as capital gains.  Thus, 
carried interest would appear as part of AGI, but would be taxed at lower rates.  In addition, there is some evidence 
that hedge fund managers defer the realization of ordinary income into the future. See Fleischer (2007).   21
investment advisory employees.  This works out to $160 million per minimum number of employees and 
$36 million per maximum number of employees.  Similarly, this works out to $550 million per minimum 
number of employees and $159 million per maximum number of investment advisory employees.  The 
average of the minimum and maximum is $98 million per employee and $305 million per investment 
advisory employee. 
Another way of looking at this is to divide the total hedge fund assets at these firms by the total 
number of employees.  On this basis, the firms have $65 million per minimum number of employees and 
$23 million per maximum number of employees.  Similarly, this works out to $220 million per minimum 
number of employees and $54 million per maximum number of investment advisory employees.  The 
average of the minimum and maximum is $44 million per employee and $137 million per investment 
advisory employee. 
In what follows, we assume that the average highly paid employee controls or is compensated 
from $100 million of assets.  Under the assumption of total fees of 3.2%, this works out to $3.2 million in 
fees per highly compensated employee.  If we then apply this to $900 billion of hedge fund assets, we 
obtain 9,000 highly compensated employees with average fees of $3.2 million.   
This is a very rough estimate.  This overstates total compensation to these employees because the 
hedge fund must pay expenses from these fees.  However, operating margins in the asset management 
business are quite high.  Before compensating top executives and paying mutual fund marketing expenses 
(which hedge fund firms do not pay), it is common for publicly-traded mutual fund firms to report 
operating margins exceeding 70%.
6  These estimates also overstate the number of employees who are 
highly compensated to the extent that some of the assets and employees are not in the United States.  At 
the same time, these estimates will understate total compensation per employee to the extent that the 
hedge fund firms have other activities and manage other assets.   
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It is likely that many of the big hedge fund payments will appear as ordinary partnership income 
on the K-1’s of the owners or partners of the hedge funds.  Some unknown number of the most highly 
compensated employees who are not partners will receive W-2 income. 
Given the huge increase in hedge fund assets, it is virtually certain that the number of highly 
compensated employees at hedge funds has increased substantially over time.  In 1984, when there were 
almost no hedge funds, there would have been very few such employees.  In 1994, when hedge funds had 
less than $100 million in assets under management, hedge fund fees were roughly 10% of the fees in 
2005.   At the same fee per employee ratio, this implies a ten-fold increase in the number of highly 
compensated employees.  To the extent that the amount of money managed per individual has increased, 
the number of highly compensated employees will have increased less, but the compensation of each 
individual will have increased more. 
 
  2.  Venture Capital and Private Equity Funds 
  The capital committed to venture capital (VC) private equity (PE) or buyout funds also has 
increased substantially over time.  The first three columns of table 3b present the capital committed to 
U.S. VC funds, the number of funds raised each year from 1980 to 2005, and capital per fund according 
to Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics database.  The next three columns do the same for PE firms.  
When a VC or PE firm raises a fund, its investors (limited partners) commit to provide a certain amount 
of money over the investing life of the fund (usually five years).  The investments are harvested over the 
subsequent five to ten years, giving a total commitment period or investment life of ten to fifteen years.  
The commitments, therefore, represent money committed, but not necessarily invested in a given year.   
The table shows that combined annual commitments to VC and PE funds have grown from less 
than $2.5 billion combined in 1982 to less than $35 billion in 1994 to over $150 billion in 2005.  Both the 
number of funds and the size of the average fund have increased. 
For purposes of calculating fees, columns 7 and 8 estimate the total amount of money under 
management in VC and PE at any one time as the sum of the capital committed over the previous seven   23
years (including the current year).  This assumes that the VC and PE firms earn management fees on the 
capital committed for seven years.  Most funds actually earn management fees for ten years, but the 
management fee typically declines after the five year investment period.  Overall, the seven year 
assumption will tend to be conservative. 
  As mentioned above, compensation typically consists of a management fee (based on committed 
capital) and a share of the profits.  Metrick and Yasuda (2007) report median management fees of 2% and 
median profit shares of 20% for a large sample of VC and PE funds raised from 2000 to 2005. 
  Accordingly, the last four columns estimate fees paid to VC and PE funds using the analogous 
methodology to that used initially for hedge funds.  The management fees are estimated by multiplying 
the assets under management at the beginning of the year (end of previous year) by 2%.  The profit share 
is estimated by multiplying the average return for the year (provided by Venture Economics) if it is 
positive by the beginning of year assets under management to get net profit.  Because net profit is after 
carry, we gross up the net profit by dividing by 80% to get the gross profit for the year.  We then take 
20% of the gross profit as the estimate of the profit share.  Total fees are the sum of management fees and 
carried interest.   
  VC and PE fees also have increased substantially over time.  Under these assumptions, the 
combined fees to VC and PE funds have increased from less than $0.25 billion in 1984 to almost $3 
billion in 1994 to roughly $18 billion in 2004 and 2005. 
  As with the hedge funds, the simple calculation above almost certainly understates compensation 
because it assumes that all VC and PE funds earned the average return for the year.  In fact, returns are 
volatile around the average and the 20% profit share acts like a call option, increasing in value with 
volatility.   It also is likely the case that VC and PE fund returns are more volatile than hedge fund returns 
because they are calculated based on performance over the life of the fund rather than annually.    
  Kaplan and Schoar (2005) present evidence on the performance of VC and PE funds.  They report 
that the historical standard deviation of the returns on VC funds is between 19% and 34%; on PE funds, 
between 19% and 27%.  (The standard deviations depend on whether funds are value- or equal-weighted   24
and whether the returns are calculated by Venture Economics or Kaplan and Schoar.)  If we 
conservatively, assume a standard deviation of 22%, risk-free rate of 3%, the 20% profit share and a 2% 
management fee, the expected annual fees for VC and PE firms equal 4% of assets under management.  
As depicted in figure 2, this would equal a total for VC and PE firms of roughly $30 billion in 2004 and 
2005. 
  Again, the $18 billion to $30 billion estimates are the same order of magnitude as the total pay to  
non-financial top executives, investment banking MDs, and hedge fund investors. 
  How do these fees translate into compensation?   In their sample of VC and PE funds, Metrick 
and Yasuda (2007) report that the typical VC and PE fund has 6 partners (median of 5 and average of 
6.4).  Over the last five years, the Venture Economics figures indicate over 1,000 VC funds and almost 
900 PE funds have been raised.  This implies more than 10,000 highly compensated partners, a large 
increase over the number 25 years ago. 
At $18 billion in fees, this represents roughly $1.3 million per VC partner and $2.3 million per PE 
partner; at $30 billion in fees, this represents $2.0 million per VC partner and $3.8 million per PE partner.  
Even these estimates may be low.  Metrick and Yasuda (2007) estimate that the average partner in a VC 
firm can expect to receive $13 million in present value over the life of a fund; the average partner in a PE 
firm, $18 million in present value.  Assuming a fund lasts for ten years, this works out to fees of $1.3 
million and $1.8 million per partner per year in present value.  However, successful firms invest their 
funds in four to five years or less, at which point they raise another fund.  As a result, the net present 
value may effectively reflect four or five years of fees, not ten.  Assuming five years, this would put the 
present value of average annual fees received per partner at VC and PE firms equal to $2.6 million and 
$3.6 million, respectively.  
Our calculations and those of Metrick and Yasuda (2007), then, give us a range of fees per 
partner of $1.3 to $2.6 million per VC partner and $1.8 to $3.8 million per PE partner.  The fees, of 
course, do not equal compensation received by the partners.  VC and PE firms must pay operating 
expenses – employee salaries, rents, travel, deal costs, etc. – out of the fees.  It is difficult to know exactly   25
what fraction of fees these expenses represent.  It seems reasonable to assume that the expenses must be 
less than the management fee.  Otherwise, the partners would need to finance their business themselves. 
As the management fees represent roughly ½ of the total fees, this puts a lower bound on partner 
compensation of ½ of the amounts at the beginning of this paragraph.  In addition, these fees are averages.  
We have not attempted to estimates the distribution around these averages. 
PE and VC investors are likely taxed similarly to hedge fund investors in that most of the income 
will appear as partnership income on the K-1’s of the owners or partners of the funds.  The one difference 
is that a larger fraction of the PE and VC income will be in the form of long term capital gains.  The 
reason for this is that most of the investments will have a term of greater than one year and the 20% profit 
shares on those investments will appear as capital gains.  (Again, see Fleischer (2007)). 
In summary, there is no doubt that VC and PE partners have contributed to the increase in the top 
end of the income distribution.  It seems likely that almost all of the 10,000 individuals earn in excess of 
the $0.48 million necessary to put them in the top 0.5% of the income distribution.   
As estimated fees increased by more than ten times from 1984 to 1994, and, again, by a factor of 
six times from 1994 to 2005, this undoubtedly represents a large increase in the number of such 
individuals since 1984 and 1994.  In 1984, roughly 500 VC and PE funds were raised over the previous 
five years.  These funds had capital under management of $19 billion.  At 4% total fees, this translates 
into $0.76 billion of fees.  With six partners per fund, this translates into 3,000 partners and $0.25 million 
in fees per partner or $0.41 million per partner in $2005.  So, the number of partners has more than tripled 
and the fees per partner have increased by more than a factor of five times over this period.   
 
3.  Contributions to the top end of the distribution 
In the previous subsection, we estimate average fees per highly compensated individual or partner 
in hedge fund, VC, and PE firms.  We are unable to estimate the contributions of such firms to the very 
high end of the distribution.  In this section, we use other data sources to attempt to do so.     26
Table 4a presents Institutional Investor’s estimates of the incomes of the top 25 most 
compensated hedge fund managers from 2003 to 2005.  The table also presents the estimates for those 
hedge fund managers based in the U.S.  The table confirms that the top hedge fund investors earn large 
amounts of compensation.  The 20
th most highly paid hedge fund manager in the U.S. earned $92, $110 
and $150 million, respectively in those three years.  This compares to 3 non-financial ExecuComp U.S. 
executives and our estimate of 4 total non-financial U.S. executives who earned more than $100 million 
in 2004.  
It also is striking that the top 25 individual hedge fund managers in the U.S. earned a combined 
total of $5.2 billion, $6.3 billion and over $9 billion, respectively, in 2003, 2004 and 2005.  
Table 4b presents estimated earnings of top earners in the financial industry more broadly.  The 
first two columns present the rankings from Financial World for 1988 and 1995.  Financial World 
includes all financial industry individuals including investment bankers, hedge fund and private equity 
investors.  The last three columns combine the rankings from Trader Monthly and II Alpha for 2003 to 
2005.   
Trader Monthly ranks the top traders and hedge fund professionals only.  The Trader Monthly 
and Alpha lists do not include PE and VC investors and, therefore, understate such incomes relative to the 
Financial World rankings.  The recent S-1 filings of Blackstone and KKR indicate that some PE investors 
earn sums comparable to those of the hedge fund investors.  For example, KKR reported net income of 
$773 million and $941 million in 2004 and 2005.  With Henry Kravis and George Roberts each owning 
37.5% of KKR, these imply incomes for Kravis and Robers of almost $300 million in 2004 and over $350 
million in 2005.  Blackstone reported net income of $1.5 billion and $1.3 billion in 2004 and 2005.  The 
29.8% of Blackstone owned by Stephen Schwartzman implies income of $447 million and $388 million 
in 2004 and 2005.  At least two other Blackstone executives appear to have earned more than $60 million 
each in each of those two years. 
Although we do not include PE investor incomes, table 4b suggests some conclusions.  There is 
not much of a change in the very top end of the distribution from 1988 to 1995.  In both 1988 and 1995,   27
40 individuals earned more than $30 million in $2004 and 10 individuals earned more than $82 million in 
$2004.  There appears to have been a large increase in the top end since then.  In 2004 and 2005, among 
only the traders and hedge fund investors, more than 57 individuals earned more than $30 million and 
more than 37 individuals earned more than $82 million.  Again, this indicates a large increase in the very 
top end of the income distribution.    
 
  C. Mutual  Funds 
  At the same time that alternative assets under management and their fees have grown 
substantially, so have institutionally managed assets, particularly mutual funds.  In this section, we 
document the increase in assets under management and fees paid to mutual funds.   
  Table 5a shows that total assets under management at mutual funds have increased from $135 
billion in 1980 to $2.16 trillion in 1994 to $8.9 trillion in 2005 with more than half of the assets in 2005 
residing in equity mutual funds.  The number of funds has grown from fewer than one thousand to almost 
eight thousand.   
Table 5b uses data from the 2006 Investment Company Institute Handbook to report the fees 
including sales loads paid on these funds.  The asset weighted percentage fees have declined over time, 
driven by the increase in index funds and by the decrease in the use of sales loads.  While the percentage 
fees have declined, the huge increase in assets under management has lead to a substantial increase in 
fees.  Fees have increased from $1.3 billion in 1980 to $31.1 billion in 1995 to $73.1 billion in 2005.  In 
$2005, they have increased from $2.7 billion in 1980 to $37.9 billion in 1995 to $73.1 billion in 2005.
7 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure the number of people involved in the mutual fund 
industry and the pay distribution of those individuals.  The fees are paid to investment managers as well 
as to brokers and intermediaries who sell or distribute the mutual funds.  Some of these individuals work 
for the top securities firms and are already counted in the investment banking section.  Rather than 
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provide inaccurate estimates, we simply conclude that there are likely many highly compensated 
individuals in the mutual fund industry and that number has grown substantially since 1980.   
 
IV. Lawyers 
  We next look at the pay of top corporate lawyers.  To do this we rely on American Lawyer 
Magazine’s annual surveys of law firm revenues and compensation.  In 1985, Am Law covered the top 50 
firms (by revenue); in 1995, the top 100 firms (by revenue); and, in 2005, the top 200 firms.  The Am 
Law surveys are released mid-year and, therefore, reflect results for the previous calendar year.  Table 6a, 
therefore, summarizes the Am Law results for the calendar years 1984 (Am Law 50), 1994 (Am Law 100) 
and 2004 (Am Law 200). 
For the purpose of studying compensation, the current Am Law surveys report the average profit 
per equity partner at each of the top law firms.  Because law firms are typically structured as flow-through 
entities for tax purposes, the profit an equity partner earns should appear as ordinary income to the partner 
and will show up in the partner’s AGI.  As a result, average profit per equity partner likely provides a 
lower bound on the AGI of the average equity partner because it does not include non-law firm income 
earned by the partner.  Because law firms are typically structured as partnerships, equity partners do not 
receive W-2’s and, therefore, will not show up in the distribution of W-2s. 
In our analysis, we prefer to use profit per equity partner because those partners are the key 
partners in the firms.  According to the Am Law survey, equity partners are those who file a Schedule K-1 
tax form and receive no more than half their compensation on a fixed-income basis.  Non-equity partners 
receive more than half of their compensation on a fixed-income basis.  They are lawyers whom the firm 
wants to retain, but who do not receive the same voting rights, decision rights, and compensation.    
By 2004, most law firms distinguished between equity partners and non-equity partners, with the 
median Am Law 100 firm having roughly one non-equity partner for each three equity partners.   The 
2004 Am Law numbers report profits per equity partner.   For the 1984 Am Law 50, we use total partners 
and profits per all partners.  At that time, few firms, if any, had gone to the model of non-equity partners,   29
so these calculations represent primarily equity partners.  In 1994, some firms had begun to appoint non-
equity partners.   As a result the Am Law 100 reports the number of equity and non-equity partners.  The 
median firm in the Am Law 100 had no non-equity partners.  Unfortunately, the Am Law 100 only 
reports profit per total partners not profits per equity partner.  In our analysis, we report the number of 
equity partners and profits per all partners for 1994.  This slightly understates true profits per equity 
partner, but likely not more than 10%.  When we estimate profits per partner for the 56 firms that do not 
have any non-equity partners, we obtain average (median) profits per partner that are 9.4% (5.7%) greater 
than the profits per partner for all 100 firms. 
  Table 6a summarizes the data from the 1984, 1994, and 2004 Am Law surveys.  The data exhibit 
two strong patterns.   First, a large number of law partners are in the top 0.5% and top 0.1% of the income 
distribution in 2004.  Second, both the compensation of law partners and the number of highly 
compensated law partners have grown substantially over time. 
Table 6a indicates that the average profits per partner in the top 50, top 100, and top 200 U.S. law 
firms in 2004, respectively, were $1.26, $1.01 and $0.83 million.  These averages are the averages of the 
average profit per partner for each firm.  The medians of the averages are lower, at $1.08, $0.86 and $0.67 
million.  These profits accrued to, respectively, 11,034, 17,861, and 26,755 partners.  Average profits per 
partner exceed $2 million for 9 firms; they are at least $0.5 million for 93 of the top 100 firms, and 152 of 
the top 200 firms.  
Because, the law firms do not make the profit distributions to individual partners known to the 
public, it is impossible to know exactly how the payouts to individual partners are distributed around the 
average profits per partner.  Conversations with law partners suggest that the distribution is not so skewed 
as the distribution of CEO and investment banker MD pay.  In what follows, we make the following 
distributional assumption.  We assume that 1/3 of the partners earn more than the average while 2/3 of the 
partners make less than the average.  We assume that the most highly paid partner earns twice the average 
while the least highly paid partner earns half the average.  We base this distribution on conversations with 
law partners at top firms.  For some firms, the distribution is less skewed; for others, more skewed.  Our   30
sense is that this captures the distribution on average.  The bottom line of our results would not be very 
different if we assumed a less skewed distribution. 
  Based on these distributions, we estimate that 14,351 of the 17,861 partners in the Am Law 100 
earned more than $0.48 million in 2004.  Table 6b indicates that these partners represent more than 2% of 
the returns with AGI’s in the top 0.5% and top 0.1%.  
If we extend the analysis to the Am Law 200, we estimate that another 4,246 lawyers earn more 
than $0.48 million, bringing the total to over 18,000; and another 312 earn more than $1.4 million 
bringing the total to 3,477.
8  These figures imply that when the Am Law 200 firms are included, equity 
partners comprise more than 2.6% of the AGI distribution above the top 0.5% and top 0.1%.  When we 
exclude investment income Am Law 200 partners comprise more than 4% of the top 0.1%. 
  It also is worth pointing out that the 26,000 plus equity partners at Am Law 200 firms earn a total 
of roughly $22 billion (at $0.83 million per partner).  This is the same order of magnitude as the total pay 
to non-financial top executives, investment banking MDs, hedge fund investors, and PE and VC 
investors. 
  Furthermore, table 6a indicates that lawyers have experienced a large real increase in pay over the 
last 10 and 20 years.  In 1984, the average profit per partner at the top 50 firms was $0.309 million or 
$0.498 million in $2004.  By 1994, the average profit per partner had increased to $0.531 million or 
$0.636 in $2004.  And by 2004, the average profit per partner at the top 50 firms had increased to $1.260 
million. 
The table also reports the AGI cutoffs for the top 0.5% and top 0.1% of the AGI distribution in 
those three years.  In 2004, AGI of $0.48 million and $1.40 million, respectively, were in the top 0.5% 
and top 0.1% of the AGI distribution.  In 1994, the analogous figures were $0.29 million and $0.73 M; in 
1984, they were $0.16 million and $0.42 million.  While the average profit per partner in 1984 and 1994 
                                                           
8 Because some of the partners of these law firms are based overseas, this overstates the true number of partners in 
these brackets.  It is impossible to know how large this effect is, both absolutely and compared to the overstatement 
for top executives.   31
is close to the midpoint of the two cutoffs, the average profit per partner is much closer to the top 0.1% in 
2004 suggesting that the average law partner is now at a higher point in the AGI distribution than before. 
Table 6a also indicates that the number of partners has increased substantially going from an 
average of 90 in 1984, to 155 in 1994 and to 221 in the top 50 firms in 2004.  In the top 100 firms, the 
average number of equity partners increased from an average of 130 in 1994 to 179 in 2004.   
   Table 6b shows the effect of the increase in equity partners and compensation per partner by 
comparing the contribution of the equity partners to the top AGI brackets in the different years.  The table 
indicates that the equity partners at top law firms have markedly increased their presence in the top 
income brackets.  In 1984, Am Law 50 partners represented 0.50% of the top 0.5% and 1.06% of the top 
0.1%.  These increased to 0.90% and 0.97%, respectively, in 1994, and to 1.50% and 2.05% in 2004.   
Am Law 100 partners comprised 1.46% of the top 0.5% and 1.30% of the top 0.1%  AGI brackets in 
1994.  This increased to 2.17% and 2.39%, respectively, in 2004. 
  Overall then, the representation of top corporate lawyers in the top 0.5% and top 0.1% AGI 
brackets has increased substantially over time.   
 
V. Professional  Athletes 
  In this section, we look at the pay of professional athletes.  To do this, we collect compensation 
information on professional baseball, football, and basketball players in the U.S.  These three sports are 
among the most popular in the U.S. and include a relatively large number of athletes.   
We obtain baseball compensation information for 1984 to 2005 from the “Business of Baseball” 
website (http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/data.htm) and from USA Today for 2005.  We obtain 
basketball and football compensation information from Professor Rodney Fort of Washington State 
University  (http://www.rodneyfort.com/PHSportsEcon/Common/OtherData/DataDirectory.html).  Fort 
credits sports statistician Patricia Bender for the basketball information from 1991-2000, and the USA 
Today site for information from 2001-present.  He obtained the football information from USA Today   32
and Sports Illustrated.  These figures understate AGI because they only include income earned from the 
athlete’s team and, therefore, do not include any income from endorsements and other sources 
Table 7 describes the extent to which those professional athletes are represented in the top end of 
AGI distributions for 1995 and 2004.   The level of pay has increased substantially with the average 
athlete earning $1.85 million in 2004 versus $0.78 million in 1995.  The table also indicates that the 
athletes represent roughly the same percentage of the top 0.1%, but a larger percentage of the top 0.01% 
AGI bracket in 2004 than they did in 1995.  In 1995 and 2004, the athletes in baseball, football and 
basketball represented 0.8% of the returns in the top 0.1%.  At the same time, the athletes represented 
1.0% of the returns in the top 0.01% in 1995, but 1.5% of the returns in the top 0.01% in 2004.   
The table also shows that in total, the 3400 plus athletes earned just over $6.3 billion in 2004. 
This sum is substantially smaller than the sums going to the other groups we have analyzed. 
Over this period, then, professional athletes increased their pay substantially, maintained or 
increased their share of the top brackets, but represented a small fraction of those very top brackets.  
 
VI.  Contributions to top end of the income distribution 
  In this section, we attempt to aggregate the results from the previous section to see how many 
individuals we can identify at the very top end of the income distribution.   
  To summarize, we have estimated the number of high income individuals who are top executives 
at public companies, highly compensated investment bankers, hedge fund investors, VC investors, PE 
investors, lawyers and professional athletes.  Table 8a presents a summary of the individuals that we 
count in each category for the top fractiles – from top 0.5% to top 0.0001% -- of the earnings distribution 
in 2004.  Table 8a also includes the estimated earnings of the individuals in the Forbes Celebrity 100 in 
2004.  The table does not include estimates of the number of highly paid individuals at mutual funds and 
other institutional money managers.  As a result, we believe that the estimates in these tables understate 
the individuals in our groups that are in the top brackets.     33
  In table 8a, we use the ExecuComp data on realized pay and our estimates for the non-
ExecuComp executives to populate the top brackets for non-financial and financial executives.  We use 
the exponential-based estimates of the distribution of investment banker income.  For hedge fund 
investors, we use an average compensation of 3.2% of assets under management and estimate an average 
of $3.2 million in compensation per 9,000 highly compensated employees.  We assume that all 9,000 
have AGI above $0.48 million (top 0.5%) and 1/3 or 3,000 have AGI above $1.4 million (top 0.1%).  We 
use Trader Monthly and the II Alpha 25 for the very top end of the hedge fund distribution.  We almost 
certainly underestimate the number of hedge fund investors in the top 0.01% ($7.2 million) because the 
Trader Monthly and II Alpha lists do not report enough hedge fund investor incomes to go below $12 
million.  For VC investors, we assume an average compensation of 4.0% of assets under management and 
estimate an average of $1.8 million (the midpoint of the $1.3 to $2.3 million range) in compensation per 
6,000 partners.  We assume that all 6,000 partners have AGI above $0.48 million and 1/5 or 1,200 have 
AGI above $1.4 million.  For PE investors, under the 4.0% assumption, we estimate an average of $2.8 
million in compensation per 5,400 partners.  We assume that all 5,400 have AGI above $0.48 million and 
2/5 or 2,160 have AGI above $1.4 million.  For VC and PE, we do not try to make any assumptions for 
incomes above the top 0.01%.  We do recognize that at least three PE investors – Kravis, Roberts and 
Schwarzman – earned at least $101 million and were in the top 0.0001% bracket.  We use the 
distributions calculated earlier for law partners and professional athletes.   
  Table 8a indicates that our groups comprise at least 9.1% of those in the top 0.5% AGI bracket, 
about 20% of those in the top 0.01% bracket, and approximately 26.5% of those in the very top 0.0001% 
bracket.  
Including financial top executives, investment bankers, hedge funds, VC investors, and PE 
investors, we count more than twice as many Wall Street individuals as Main Street individuals (non-
financial top executives) in the top 0.5% and the top 0.1% of the AGI distribution.  
We also estimate that financial top executives, investment bankers, and hedge fund investors 
comprise a greater fraction of the top 0.01%, a similar fraction of the top 0.001% and a substantially   34
greater fraction of the top 0.0001% than the top Main Street individuals.  Including VC investors, PE 
investors, mutual fund investors, and measuring hedge fund investors more accurately would almost 
certainly tip the fraction in favor of Wall Street for the top 0.001% as well.  
  When we estimate AGI brackets excluding investment income, our groups explain a larger 
fraction of the top groups, particularly the top 0.01%.  Our groups comprise almost 10% of the top 0.5%, 
22.2% of the top 0.1%, almost 33% of the top 0.01% and more than 26% of the top 0.001%.  We are 
unable to do this calculation for the top 0.0001%. 
Table 8b takes an alternative look at our different groups.  It summarizes the dollar amounts of 
AGI and fees of our various groups and how they have changed over time.  The AGI of the non-financial 
executives in ExecuComp in 2004 is $34 billion.  This has increased in real terms by a factor of 2.6 times 
from $12.9 billion ($10.7 billion nominal).   
Using the exponential distribution, we estimate that investment bankers earned a total of $28.4 
billion in 2004.  Because of data availability issues, we are unable to estimate total compensation in 1994. 
Fees to hedge funds investors totaled $25.4 million in 2004, an increase in real terms by a factor 
over 7 times relative to 1994.  Fees to PE funds and VC funds totaled $18.4 billion and $10.9 billion in 
2004.  These represent increases in real terms by factors of 3.9 and 6.8 times respectively relative to 1994.  
Estimated fees to mutual funds increased by 1.9 times in real terms from 1995 to 2004 after having 
increased by 4.6 times from 1985 to 1995. 
Law partners at the Am Law 100 earned a total of $18.1 billion in 2004, representing an increase 
in real profits of 2.6 times relative to 1994, virtually identical to the increase to top non-financial 
executives.  
While it is not possible to map all of these results into changes in the income distribution, these 
results again strongly suggest that Wall Street and legal professionals have contributed at least as much as 
and probably more than top executives of non-financial public companies to the widening of the income 
distribution. 
   35
VII. Pay-for-Performance 
  Some critics of CEO and top executive pay point not only to the high levels of pay, but also argue 
that those executives are not paid for performance.  For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that 
CEO compensation schemes “weaken managers’ incentives to increase firm value and even create 
incentives to take actions that reduce long-term reduce long-term reduce firm value.”  They and others 
have led some to conclude that there is no link between top executive pay and firm performance.  The 
compensation of top executives is often contrasted with that of hedge fund, VC, and PE investors who are 
supposedly highly paid for performance. 
  In this section, we provide evidence on the relation between firm performance and CEO 
compensation.  We also discuss the extent to which hedge fund, VC, and PE investors are paid for 
performance. 
First, we use the ExecuComp database to compare the amount of compensation the CEOs 
actually receive – realized compensation or TDC2 – to the company performance over the previous one, 
three, and five years.  Each year from 1999 to 2004, we sort the ExecuComp firms into five groups based 
on beginning of year book assets.  We do this because it is well-known that compensation varies with 
firm size.  (See Gabaix and Landier (2006)).  Within each size group, we sort the CEOs into five groups 
based on realized compensation from lowest to highest.  For each firm-year, we measure performance as 
the total return to the firm’s stock less the value-weighted performance of the firm’s industry (using 
Fama-French industry returns).  We then compare performance across the different compensation-size 
groups. 
Figure 3 reports the results graphically for the three previous years of stock performance.  Within 
each size quintile, actual compensation is highly related to performance, i.e., there is strong pay-for-
performance.  Firms with the CEOs in the top 20% of compensation outperform their industries by an 
average of  61%.  Firms with CEOs in the bottom 20% of compensation underperform their industries by 
an average of 19%.  The results are qualitatively identical for one year and five years of stock 
performance.   36
We suspect some of the confusion over pay is that critics focus on ex ante or estimated pay rather 
than realized pay.  Because much of realized pay reflects the exercise of in-the-money options, CEOs will 
tend to receive large payoffs whenever their firms’ stock has increased substantially.  It is not surprising 
that most large payoffs result from strong stock performance.  Estimates in Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) 
imply that at least 1/2 of the expected value of CEO compensation has been equity-based since 1996. 
  It also is worth mentioning that CEO turnover has increased over time as has the relation of CEO 
turnover to poor performance. (See Kaplan and Minton (2006)).  Those results suggest that boards do 
hold CEOs accountable for poor performance, providing CEOs additional incentives to perform.   
   It is interesting to compare top executive compensation to hedge fund, VC, and PE investor 
compensation.  As mentioned earlier, all three types of investors receive compensation that is a 
combination of a fixed annual management fee and a variable share of profits, usually 20%.  These 
option-like payoffs imply that compensation of hedge fund, VC, and PE investors is strongly related to 
performance if the performance is positive, but is unrelated to performance if the performance is poor.  In 
other words, hedge fund, VC, and PE fund investors can earn a lot of money even with mediocre or even 
poor performance. Estimates in Metrick and Yasuda (2007) suggest that the performance-based 
component – the profit share or carried interest – of VCs and PE investors represents less than 40% of the 
expected present value of compensation.   
  Although the compensation of these different groups is not directly comparable, it is not obvious 
that CEO pay is any less related to performance than that of hedge fund, VC, and PE investors. 
   
VIII.  Summary and Implications 
  We have attempted to measure how much of the inequality today at the top end of the income 
distribution can be attributed to different sectors of the economy – top executives of non-financial firms 
(Main Street); financial service sector employees from investment banks, hedge funds, VC funds, PE 
funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); lawyers; and professional athletes.  We also have estimated how 
those contributions have varied over time.     37
  Studying these groups, we believe we are able to identify at least 15% to 26.5% of the individuals 
who comprise the AGI categories at and above the top 0.1%.  We estimate that CEOs and top executives 
of non-financial public companies comprise fewer than half of these individuals and do not comprise 
more than 6.4% of any of the top AGI brackets.  Individuals we characterize as Wall Street professionals 
comprise a greater a fraction of the top end of the distribution than the top five executives of “Main 
Street” public companies. 
We believe our assumptions are generally conservative and, therefore, these groups – particularly 
the non-executive groups – may represent a larger fraction of the very top than we are able to report.  
Nevertheless, even under less conservative assumptions, we doubt those groups could possibly explain 
more than 40% of the very top categories.  While our estimates represent a substantial portion of the top 
income groups, they clearly miss a large number of high-earning individuals.  This seems strongly 
inconsistent with the claim in Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) that CEOs, celebrities, and athletes explain 
most of the top end of the distribution.  We suspect that some of the missing individuals are trial lawyers, 
executives of privately-held companies, and independently wealthy individuals who have a high AGI. 
We also find that the representation of the top executives in the top AGI brackets has increased 
only modestly from 1994 to 2004, particularly using ex ante compensation.  Using realized compensation, 
top executives comprise roughly the same fraction of the top 0.1% of the AGI distribution in 2004 as they 
did in 1994 and a somewhat higher fraction of the top 0.01% (5.3% in 2004 versus 3.9% in 1994).  Using 
ex ante compensation, top executives comprise a slightly lower fraction of the top 0.1% (3.32% versus 
3.55%) and a slightly higher fraction of the top 0.01% (3.93% versus 3.65%) in 2004 than they did in 
1994.  In contrast, the contributions of hedge fund managers, private equity investors, venture capital 
investors, and corporate lawyers have clearly increased substantially over the past 10 and 20 years, likely 
by a greater amount than the top executives. 
These results inform some of the different explanations for the increased skewness at the top end 
of the income distribution.  As mentioned earlier, these explanations include trade theories (Hecksher 
(1931), Olin (1933), Stolper and Samuelson (1941)), skill biased technological change (Katz and Murphy   38
(1992)), increasing returns to generalists rather than specialists (Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Frydman 
(2005)), stealing theories (Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005)), social norms 
(Piketty and Saez (2006a) and Levy and Temin(2007)), greater scale (Gabaix and Landier (2006)), and 
the economics of superstars (Rosen (1981) which posits technological advance as an explanation for 
greater scale. 
We believe our results are not well-explained by trade theories, increasing returns to generalists, 
stealing theories, and social norms. 
The trade theories predict that the increase in inequality will be greater among individuals or 
groups in industries that are most engaged in trade.  It seems unlikely that trade theories can account for 
the increase in inequality at the top levels of the income distribution given the breadth of the phenomenon 
across the occupations we study.  In particular, it seems difficult for trade to explain the increase in the 
top end of VC investors, PE investors, and, particularly, lawyers and professional athletes.  For example, 
it is difficult to understand how trade has increased the pay of U.S. lawyers (most of whose human capital 
is country-specific) by a factor of four over the last twenty years..   
The theory of increasing returns to generalists predicts an increased return to those with generalist 
skills, and has been proffered as one explanation for the increase in CEO and top executive pay.  We 
think the types of occupations responsible for some of the increase in the top end of the income 
distribution are not consistent with this theory.  In particular, we do not believe that lawyers, hedge fund 
investors, investment bankers, or professional athletes have become less specialized / more general over 
time.  In fact, the opposite seems more likely to be true.   
The stealing theories argue that corporate governance deteriorated in the last ten years to such an 
extent that CEOs and top executives have been able to increase their compensation substantially through 
what amounts to stealing.  CEOs (and top executives) are the only one of the groups we study who some 
argue can set their own pay without competitive negotiation.  While we do not test directly whether any 
group of individuals is stealing or not, our evidence suggests that stealing CEOs or poor corporate 
governance cannot possibly be more than a small part of the picture of increasing income inequality, even   39
at the very upper end of the distribution.  First, other groups that are not in a position to steal have 
experienced equal or larger increases in their contribution to the top AGI brackets.  Second, top 
executives occupy roughly the same part of the top AGI brackets in 2004 as they did in 1994 using ex 
ante compensation – the amount that boards of directors expect to pay.  Third, the top executives 
represent less than 6.4% of any of the top AGI brackets (using realized pay) and CEOs represent less than 
5% of any of the top brackets.  Fourth, realized top executive compensation (as measured by TDC2) is 
strongly related to a company’s stock performance.  
Our evidence also is hard to reconcile with the arguments in Piketty and Saez (2006a) and Levy 
and Temin (2007) that the increase in pay at the top is driven by the recent removal of social norms 
regarding pay inequality.  Piketty and Saez (2006a) suggest that “impediments to free markets due to 
labor market regulations, unions, or social norms regarding pay inequality can keep executive pay below 
market.  Such impediments have been largely removed in the United States, but still exist in Europe and 
Japan.”  Levy and Temin (2007) emphasize the importance of Federal government policies towards 
unions, income taxation and the minimum wage.  We do not think our evidence is favorable towards a 
central role for social norms.  While top executive pay has increased, so has the pay of other groups, 
particularly Wall Street groups, who are and were less subject to disclosure and, arguably, less subject to 
social norms.  In addition, the compensation arrangements at hedge funds, VC funds, and PE funds of a 
2% management fee and 20% profit share have not changed much, if at all, in the last twenty-five years 
(see Sahlman (1990), Gompers and Lerner (1999), and Metrick and Yasuda (2007)).  Furthermore, it is 
not clear how greater unionization would have suppressed the pay of those on Wall Street.  In other 
words, there is no evidence of a change in social norms on Wall Street.  What has changed is the amount 
of money managed and the concomitant amount of pay. 
We believe that our evidence remains more favorable toward the theories of skill-biased 
technological change, greater scale and superstars.   
Skill biased technological change predicts that inequality will increase if technological progress 
raises the productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers and / or raises the price of goods   40
made by skilled workers relative to those made by unskilled workers.  For example, computers and 
advances in information technology may complement skilled labor and substitute for unskilled labor.  
This seems likely to provide part of the explanation for the increase in pay of professional athletes 
(technology increases their marginal product by allowing them to reach more consumers) and Wall Street 
investors (technology allows them to acquire information and trade large amounts more easily and 
efficiently).   
Gabaix and Landier (2006) argue that the wage differential between the best and next best CEO 
for a firm will reflect the talent differential between the two multiplied by the size of the firm.   In 
equilibrium, CEOs and top executives will be paid more as their firms and the other firms they can work 
for become larger.  In other words, the larger size increases the returns to hiring the more productive 
people.  As long as other firms are also large, competition for talent will drive wages up.  This theory is 
not necessarily specific to CEOs and top executives. 
While we do not test the Gabaix and Landier (2006) theory directly, our results are arguably 
consistent with it.  Gabaix and Landier point out that U.S. public companies have grown larger over time, 
with the typical large firm increasing in market value by four to seven times in real terms from 1980 to 
2003.  In our analysis, we find that financial services firms, VC funds, PE funds, hedge funds, and law 
firms all have grown larger, in many instances by orders of magnitude.  For example, the typical law firm 
in the Am Law 50 has increased revenues by six times in real terms from 1984 to 2004.  Similarly, the 
total amount of capital per employee at the top 50 firms in the securities industry has increased by almost 
nine times in real terms from 1987 to 2004.    
Our results also are consistent with Rosen (1981) who argues that technological change, 
particularly in information and communications, can increase the relative productivity of superstars or 
talented individuals.  Rosen’s theory can be viewed as a combination of the previous two explanations in 
that the individuals and firms who benefit from the technological change are likely to get larger.  It is 
worth noting that Gabaix and Landier do not explain why firms (and funds) have been able to become so 
much larger over time.  The same technological change that is biased towards skills may have helped   41
firms and funds to become larger during our sample period.   42
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 Table 1a: AGI Thresholds and Top Executive Compensation, Execucomp Executives
































$0 $309,160 131,061,150 0-99 557 0.00% 0.01% 28 0.00% 0.00% 555 0.00% 0.01% 41 0.00% 0.00%
$309,160 $479,177 661,925 99-99.5 926 0.14% 0.55% 56 0.01% 0.05% 637 0.10% 0.55% 60 0.01% 0.04%
$479,177 $1,400,370 529,540 99.5-99.9 2905 0.55% 0.95% 195 0.04% 0.08% 2961 0.56% 1.00% 200 0.04% 0.08%
$1,400,370 $7,189,506 119,146 99.9-99.99 2824 2.37% 2.58% 249 0.21% 0.27% 3182 2.67% 2.76% 247 0.21% 0.25%
$7,189,506 $31,178,805 11,915 99.99-99.999 524 4.40% 4.46% 87 0.73% 0.77% 445 3.73% 3.54% 78 0.65% 0.62%





$0 $194,200 114,783,570 0-99 807 0.00% 0.01% 18 0.00% 0.00% 948 0.00% 0.01% 41 0.00% 0.00%
$194,200 $286,290 579,715 99-99.5 1124 0.19% 0.59% 67 0.00% 0.06% 777 0.13% 0.58% 50 0.01% 0.06%
$286,290 $733,602 463,772 99.5-99.9 3207 0.69% 0.99% 275 0.00% 0.11% 2851 0.61% 1.03% 243 0.05% 0.11%
$733,602 $3,179,134 104,349 99.9-99.99 2262 2.17% 2.21% 310 0.00% 0.32% 2698 2.59% 2.69% 302 0.29% 0.34%
$3,179,134 $13,444,936 10,435 99.99-99.999 275 2.64% 2.56% 52 0.50% 0.51% 394 3.78% 3.65% 87 0.83% 0.80%




Including Options Exercised Including Options Granted
Execucomp Non-Financial Execucomp Financial Execucomp Non-Financial Execucomp Financial
$2.82 $4.54 $2.45 $3.66
$1.17 $1.66 $1.28 $1.48
$0.57 $0.82
$0.91 $1.32 $1.04 $1.53
$19,084 $2,307
$6,988 $960 $8,037 $1,117
$22,025 $2,863
$0.49 $0.74
This table showsthe distribution of total compensationfor executivesin Execucomprelative to the distribution of AGI income. Only the top 5 executivesin terms of TDC2 are counted for each Execucomp
company. Financial firmsare definedas firmsthat have an SIC code between6000 and 6299, whichincludes depositoryinstitutions,nondepositorycredit institutions,and securitiesand commoditiesbrokers.
Percentilesare shownrelativeto the numberoftax filers. The cutoffsforthe top fractilesofAGI incomein 1994 are calculatedbased on the detailedIRS Statisticsof IncomefilesforUS individuals,held at the
NBER. The cutoffsfor the top fractiles of AGI income in 2004 are calculated based on the 2002 distribution(the latest years for which the detailed filesare available) and the relation betweenthe 2002 and
2004 fractiles documented in the tabulations of Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006). Table 1b: AGI Thresholds and Execucomp CEO Compensation
















$0 $309,160 131,061,150 0-99 37 0.00% 0.00% 45 0.00% 0.00%
$309,160 $479,177 661,925 99-99.5 64 0.01% 0.11% 40 0.01% 0.11%
$479,177 $1,400,370 529,540 99.5-99.9 392 0.07% 0.22% 281 0.05% 0.22%
$1,400,370 $7,189,506 119,146 99.9-99.99 749 0.63% 0.80% 890 0.75% 0.90%
$7,189,506 $31,178,805 11,91599.99-99.999 272 2.28% 2.36% 280 2.35% 2.25%





$0 $194,200 114,783,570 0-99 21 0.00% 0.00% 21 0.00% 0.00%
$194,200 $286,290 579,715 99-99.5 51 0.01% 0.12% 30 0.01% 0.12%
$286,290 $733,602 463,772 99.5-99.9 469 0.10% 0.23% 353 0.08% 0.23%
$733,602 $3,179,134 104,349 99.9-99.99 718 0.69% 0.74% 764 0.73% 0.86%
$3,179,134 $13,444,936 10,43599.99-99.999 131 1.26% 1.20% 209 2.00% 1.98%
$13,444,936 1,159 >99.999 8 0.69% 0.69% 21 1.81% 1.81%
Mean ($M)
Median ($M)






Including Options Exercised Including Options Granted
Execucomp Non-Financial Execucomp Non-Financial
This table shows the distribution of total compensation including options exercised (TDC2) for CEOs in Execucomp relative to the
distribution of AGI income. This tabulation is similar to Table 1a, the only difference being that only CEOs are counted. See note to Table
1a for further details.Table 1c: AGI Thresholds and Top Executive Compensation, Effect of Non-Execucomp Executives
































$0 $309,160 131,061,150 0-99 4111 0.00% 0.01% 6059 0.00% 0.01% 4668 0.00% 0.02% 6614 0.01% 0.02%
$309,160 $479,177 661,925 99-99.5 3292 0.50% 0.77% 4137 0.63% 0.62% 4218 0.64% 1.32% 4774 0.72% 1.17%
$479,177 $1,400,370 529,540 99.5-99.9 5259 0.99% 1.04% 3340 0.63% 0.62% 8164 1.54% 1.99% 6301 1.19% 1.62%
$1,400,370 $7,189,506 119,146 99.9-99.99 1518 1.27% 1.23% 695 0.58% 0.56% 4342 3.64% 3.80% 3877 3.25% 3.32%
$7,189,506 $31,178,805 11,915 99.99-99.999 86 0.72% 0.79% 50 0.42% 0.39% 610 5.12% 5.25% 495 4.15% 3.93%





$0 $194,200 114,783,570 0-99 2801 0.00% 0.01% 3780 0.00% 0.01% 3608 0.00% 0.02% 4728 0.00% 0.02%
$194,200 $286,290 579,715 99-99.5 1933 0.33% 0.60% 2112 0.36% 0.51% 3057 0.53% 1.19% 2889 0.50% 1.10%
$286,290 $733,602 463,772 99.5-99.9 3410 0.74% 0.86% 2856 0.62% 0.66% 6617 1.43% 1.85% 5707 1.23% 1.69%
$733,602 $3,179,134 104,349 99.9-99.99 1418 1.36% 1.36% 995 0.95% 0.86% 3680 3.53% 3.57% 3693 3.54% 3.55%
$3,179,134 $13,444,936 10,435 99.99-99.999 156 1.49% 1.34% 0 0.00% 0.00% 431 4.13% 3.91% 394 3.78% 3.65%




Including Options Exercised Including Options Exercised
Non-Execucomp Non-Financial Execucomp and Non-Execucomp Non-Financial
Including Options Granted Including Options Granted
$0.84 $1.54 $0.56 $1.23
$0.50 $0.74 $0.38 $0.70
$12,000 $34,026 $8,022 $27,106
$0.38 $0.61 $0.55 $0.77
$0.27 $0.37 $0.37 $0.46
$3,712 $10,700 $5,329 $13,366
This table shows the estimated distribution of total compensation for top 5 executives of companies not in the Execucomp database, relative to the distribution of AGI income. Non-Execucomp counts were
obtained by sampling the disclosure documents of non-Execucomp firms in 1994 and 2004, and then scaling to the number of non-Execucomp firms in the universe. See note to Table 1a for details on the
computation of the income fractile thresholds and the definition of financial versus non-financial firms.Table 1d: Non-Investment Income Thresholds and Top Executive Compensation
































$0 $270,601 131,061,150 0-99 361 0.00% 0.01% 405 0.00% 0.01% 3177 0.00% 0.02% 4864 0.00% 0.02%
$270,601 $404,912 661,925 99-99.5 702 0.11% 0.56% 497 0.08% 0.56% 4008 0.61% 1.43% 4908 0.74% 1.30%
$404,912 $1,121,024 529,540 99.5-99.9 2711 0.51% 1.02% 2524 0.48% 1.04% 8743 1.65% 2.25% 6830 1.29% 1.86%
$1,121,024 $5,143,664 119,146 99.9-99.99 3110 2.61% 3.04% 3540 2.97% 3.31% 5026 4.22% 4.65% 4520 3.79% 4.14%
$5,143,664 $19,778,205 11,915 99.99-99.999 782 6.56% 6.94% 771 6.47% 6.32% 975 8.19% 8.55% 886 7.44% 7.28%
$19,778,205 1,324 >99.999 137 10.35% 10.35% 66 4.99% 4.99% 157 11.87% 11.87% 78 5.89% 5.89%
1994 Execucomp Executives
$0 $170,850 114,783,570 0-99 555 0.00% 0.01% 760 0.00% 0.01% 2475 0.00% 0.02% 3680 0.00% 0.02%
$170,850 $243,593 579,715 99-99.5 873 0.15% 0.62% 595 0.10% 0.60% 3020 0.00% 1.29% 2767 0.48% 1.19%
$243,593 $584,837 463,772 99.5-99.9 3017 0.65% 1.08% 2573 0.55% 1.09% 6445 0.00% 2.06% 5791 1.25% 1.90%
$584,837 $2,267,697 104,349 99.9-99.99 2742 2.63% 2.80% 3052 2.92% 3.25% 4797 0.00% 4.74% 4486 4.30% 4.49%
$2,267,697 $8,922,199 10,435 99.99-99.999 464 4.45% 4.40% 655 6.28% 6.18% 657 6.30% 6.06% 655 6.28% 6.18%
$8,922,199 1,159 >99.999 46 3.97% 3.97% 62 5.35% 5.35% 46 3.97% 3.97% 62 5.35% 5.35% 
Execucomp Non-Financial Execucomp and Non-Execucomp Non-Financial
Including Options Exercised Including Options Exercised Including Options Granted Including Options Granted
This table shows the distribution of total compensation for executives relative to the distribution of AGI income. Only the top 5 executives in terms of TDC2 are counted for each Execucomp company. Non-
Execucompcounts were obtainedby samplingthe disclosuredocuments of non-Execucompfirmsin 1994 and 2004, and then scalingto the number of non-Execucomp firmsin the universe. Financialfirms are defined
as firms that have an SIC code between 6000 and 6299, whichincludesdepositoryinstitutions,nondepositorycredit institutions,and securitiesand commoditiesbrokers. Percentilesare shown relativeto the number of
tax filers. The cutoffs for the top fractilesof AGI income in 1994 are calculated based on the detailed IRS Statisticsof Income files for US individuals,held at the NBER. The cutoffs for the top fractiles of AGI
income in 2004 are calculatedbased on the 2002 distribution(the latestyears for which the detailedfilesare available)and the relationbetween the 2002 and 2004 fractilesdocumented in the tabulationsof Pikettyand
Saez (2003, 2006). Non-investmentincome is AGI excludingdividends,interest income, rental income, farm income, IRA distributions,income from estates and trusts, pension and annuity distributions,long term
capital gains, and Form 4797 income.Table 1e: AGI Thresholds and Execucomp Compensation of 5th Highest Paid Executive










Number of #5 





$0 $309,160 131,061,150 0-99 225 0.00% 0.00% 186 0.00% 0.00%
$309,160 $479,177 661,925 99-99.5 307 0.05% 0.09% 184 0.03% 0.10%
$479,177 $1,400,370 529,540 99.5-99.9 650 0.12% 0.14% 648 0.12% 0.17%
$1,400,370 $7,189,506 119,146 99.9-99.99 290 0.24% 0.22% 447 0.38% 0.35%
$7,189,506 $31,178,805 11,91599.99-99.999 7 0.06% 0.05% 14 0.12% 0.11%





$0 $194,200 114,783,570 0-99 327 0.00% 0.00% 349 0.00% 0.00%
$194,200 $286,290 579,715 99-99.5 326 0.06% 0.10% 209 0.04% 0.09%
$286,290 $733,602 463,772 99.5-99.9 599 0.13% 0.13% 565 0.12% 0.15%
$733,602 $3,179,134 104,349 99.9-99.99 177 0.17% 0.16% 293 0.28% 0.27%
$3,179,134 $13,444,936 10,43599.99-99.999 5 0.05% 0.04% 18 0.17% 0.16%













This table shows the distribution of total compensation including options exercised (TDC2) for CEOs in Execucomp relative to the distribution of AGI
income.  This tabulation is similar to Table 1a, the only difference being that only CEOs are counted.  See note to Table 1a for further details.Table 2a: Estimated Numbers of Managing Directors or Equivalents at Top Securities Firms
Currency Global U.S.





Global MDs or 
Equivalents
U.S. to Global 
Employee Ratio U.S. Employees




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Goldman Sachs Group US$ 20,550 12,932 63% 20,722 6% 1,181              64% 13,278 757               
Bear Stearns Companies US$ 6,813 6,172 91% 10,961 8% 850 91% 9,930 770               
Lehman Brothers US$ 11,576 8,225 71% 19,600 4% 784 72% 14,100 564               
Morgan Stanley US$ 23,708 17,365 73% 53,284 2% 1,071              73% 39,028
   Institutional Securities US$ 13,113 9,572 73% 29,472 3% 884                73% 21,514 645               
   Asset Management US$ 2,738 1,999 73% 6,154 3% 185                73% 4,492 135               
J.P. Morgan Chase and Co.  US$ 43,097 32,972 77% 160,968 — — 77% 123,151
   Investment Bank US$ 12,605 9,644 77% 17,478 4% 699 77% 13,372 535               
   Treasury & Securities Services US$ 4,857 3,716 77% 22,612 2% 452 77% 17,300 346               
   Assets and Wealth Management US$ 4,179 3,197 77% 12,287 2% 246 77% 9,400 188               
Credit Suisse First Boston CHF 55,139 12,267 22% 19,479 3% 584 22% 4,334 130               
Deutsche Bank EUR 21,546 65,417 — — 18% 11,954
   Corporate and Investment Bank EUR 13,414 14,130 4% 565 18% 2,582 103               
   Corporate Investments (Private Equity) EUR 621 65 4% 3 18% 12 0                    
UBS CHF 50,975 67,424 — — 39% 26,232
    Investment Banking and Securities CHF 17,600 16,970 4% 679 39% 6,602 264               
    Wealth Management (U.S.) CHF 5,158 16,969 2% 339 100% 16,969 339               
    Asset Management CHF 2,487 2,665 2% 53 100% 2,665 53                  
Merrill Lynch US$ 22,023 15,878 72% 50,600 — — 79.4% 40,200
   Global Markets and Investment Banking US$ 11,022 7,947 72% 12,000 4% 480 79.4% 9,534 381               
   Investment Management US$ 1,581 1,140 72% 2,500 4% 100 79.4% 1,986 79                  
Citigroup Global Market Holdings US$ 39,340 18,490 47% 38,000 4% 1520 47% 17,860 714               
Total U.S. MDs 6,006            
Net Revenue (millions) Employees
This table presents an assessment of the likely number of U.S. managing directors in the securities business (including asset management but excluding commercial and retail banking) at top 10 investment
banking firms. Non-italicized figures are numbers taken directly from the financial reports of the companies in question or calculated as ratios of figures taken directly from the reports. Italicized figures
represent imputed figures, which we describe in detail in the text.Table 2b: Income Distribution and Wall Street Managing Directors in 2004
Pareto Exponential Pareto Exponential Pareto Exponential Pareto Exponential
2004 AGI Distribution
$479,177 $1,400,370 99.5-99.9 529,540            60.4% 31.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.5% 1.5% 10,000        10,000       
$1,400,370 $7,189,506 99.9-99.99 119,146            32.0% 54.2% 2.7% 4.5% 3.0% 5.2% 3,964          6,900         
$7,189,506 $31,178,805 99.99-99.999 11,915              7.4% 14.7% 6.2% 12.3% 5.8% 11.2% 767             1,482         
$31,178,805 >99.999 1,324                0.3% 0.1% 2.0% 1.0% 2.0% 1.0% 26               13              
Mean ($M) $1.90 $2.84 $1.90 $2.84
Median ($M) $1.10 $2.60 $1.10 $2.60
Total Dollars ($M) — — $19,013 $28,410
2004 Distribution of AGI Excluding Investment Income
$404,912 $1,121,024 99.5-99.9 529,540            54.4% 27.2% 1.0% 0.5% 1.5% 1.5% 10,000        10,000       
$1,121,024 $5,143,664 99.9-99.99 119,146            34.6% 47.6% 2.9% 4.0% 3.4% 5.5% 4,565          7,278         
$5,143,664 $19,778,205 99.99-99.999 11,915              9.4% 24.7% 7.9% 20.7% 8.3% 19.0% 1,102          2,521         
$19,778,205 >99.999 1,324                1.7% 0.5% 12.6% 3.9% 12.6% 3.9% 166             51              
Number in Category 
and Above Explained 




Percent of Category and 





Managing Directors at 
Top Investment Banks
Percent of Category 
Bracket Explained per 
10,000 Managing 
Directors
This table reports the estimated distributions of pay for 10,000 managing alongside AGI brackets. Based on industry information, the figures assume that essentially no managing
director of a top 10 investment bank earned less than $500,000 in 2004. Two possible distributions of pay are considered. The first is a pareto distribution with a minimum value of
$500,000, estimated so that 25% of managing directors earn more than $2.5 million and truncated at $35 million, the highest payout observed for an investment banking employee in
2004. The second distribution is an exponential distribution, which we censor below at $500,000 and calibrate so that only one employee earns more than $25 million. The middle
pair of columns presents the percent of each bracket accounted for by every 10,000 managing directors, and the right-most pair presents the number of individuals earning at least the
minimum bracket amount for every 10,000 managing directors.Table 2c: Securities Industry Capital and Employees Over Time
SIA 2004 SIA 1987 IB-BA 1972
Total Number of Employees in top 50 Firms 389,181 217,813 80,784
Total Amount of Capital in top 50 Firms ($ Million) $696,087 $29,636 $2,768
Capital per Employee 1.789 0.136 0.034
Capital per Employee ($2004) 1.789 0.203 0.124
The table reports the total number of global employees and the total global capital employed at the top 50 U.S.
securities firms in 1972, 1987, and 2004.SIA information is from Securities Industry Association Handbook for
1987 and 2004.  IB-BA is Investment Banker-Broker Almanac.Table 3a: Assets Under Management and Estimated Fees for Hedge Funds 
Money Money Money Money Fees Fees
Under Under  Under  #  Funds Under  Hedge Hedge
Management Management Management # Funds # Funds Hedge Fund Management Hedge Fund Funds Funds
Year Hedge Fund Hedge Fund Hedge Fund Hedge Fund Hedge Fund No FOF Hedge Fund Returns 2/20 2/20








1986 $20 100 $20
1987 11.99 $0.46 $0.68
1988 20.16
1989 24.58
1990 $39 610 530 11.97
1991 $35 $58 880 821 694 $35 25.83
1992 $50 $96 1,100 1,105 937 $50 15.57 $0.84 $1.12
1993 $99 $168 $50 1,640 1,514 1,277 $99 25.69 $1.32 $1.60
1994 $76 $167 $57 2,080 1,945 1,654 $76 0.17 $1.98 $3.17
1995 $97 $186 $72 2,800 2,383 2,006 $97 17.70 $1.86 $2.43
1996 $130 $257 $99 3,000 2,781 2,392 $130 19.07 $2.40 $3.10
1997 $210 $368 $145 3,200 2,990 2,564 $210 18.18 $3.19 $4.16
1998 $221 $375 $154 3,500 3,325 2,848 $221 1.43 $4.28 $6.72
1999 $324 $456 $197 4,000 3,617 3,102 $324 30.77 $6.12 $7.07
2000 $408 $491 $209 4,800 3,873 3,335 $408 8.16 $7.14 $10.37
2001 $564 $599 $264 5,500 4,454 3,904 $564 4.35 $8.60 $13.06
2002 $592 $626 $310 5,700 5,379 4,598 $592 -2.89 $11.28 $18.05
2003 $795 $820 $489 7,000 6,297 5,065 $795 18.78 $14.62 $18.94
2004 $934 $973 $674 8,050 7,436 5,782 $934 8.25 $17.54 $25.44
2005 $1,105 $813 8,661 6,665 7.85 $20.51 $29.89
This table reports assets under management at hedge funds and number of hedge funds over time as reported by the Hennessee Group, Hedge Fund Research, and TASS. Hedge
fund fees are calculated in two ways, assuming annual management fees of 2% and profit share of 20% using Hennessee Group assets under management. First, hedge fund fees are
calculated using the average returns for the year and assuming that all funds earn the average return. Second, hedge fund fees are calculated assuming that fees equal 2%
management fee and that the profit share leads to fees of 1.2% per year based on a Black-Scholes calculation with expected volatility of 11% and a risk-free rate of 3%.Table 3b: Assets Under Management and Estimated Fees for Venture Capital (VC) and Private Equity (PE) Funds
Money Money VC VC PE PE
Capital  # Funds Capital Capital  # Funds Capital Under  Under  VC Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated
Committed VC per Fund Committed PE per Fund Management Management Returns Fees 2/20 Fees 2/20 Fees 2/20 Fees 2/20
Year Venture ($ M) Private Equity ($ M) VC PE Actual Expected PE Actual Expected
($B) ($B) SevenYear SevenYear Returns 22% Vol. Returns Returns 22% Vol.
($B) ($B) ($B) ($B)
1980 $2.1 54 $38 $0.2 4 $46 $2.1 $0.2
1981 $1.5 75 $20 $0.4 7 $50 $3.6 $0.5 20.10 $0.05 $0.14
1982 $1.7 89 $20 $0.6 13 $47 $5.3 $1.1 30.50 $0.10 $0.21
1983 $4.0 143 $28 $1.5 18 $86 $9.3 $2.7 54.90 $0.18 $0.37 52.50 $0.04 $0.11
1984 $3.2 120 $26 $3.5 24 $148 $12.4 $6.2 -5.80 $0.19 $0.50 -4.40 $0.05 $0.25
1985 $4.0 120 $33 $3.0 22 $136 $16.4 $9.2 -0.90 $0.25 $0.66 2.90 $0.13 $0.37
1986 $3.8 103 $37 $5.0 34 $147 $20.2 $14.2 4.40 $0.35 $0.81 11.70 $0.21 $0.57
1987 $4.5 119 $38 $16.1 48 $335 $22.6 $30.1 6.40 $0.44 $0.91 10.00 $0.32 $1.20
1988 $4.5 105 $43 $12.9 62 $209 $25.7 $42.7 2.60 $0.47 $1.03 17.70 $0.74 $1.71
1989 $5.1 105 $48 $12.2 83 $146 $29.0 $54.2 5.20 $0.55 $1.16 13.70 $1.00 $2.17
1990 $3.5 89 $39 $9.6 72 $134 $28.5 $62.3 3.00 $0.60 $1.14 -4.30 $1.08 $2.49
1991 $2.0 42 $48 $7.5 34 $219 $27.4 $66.2 22.80 $0.73 $1.10 22.20 $1.59 $2.65
1992 $5.3 82 $65 $12.3 64 $193 $28.7 $75.6 14.90 $0.65 $1.15 11.50 $1.51 $3.02
1993 $4.0 91 $44 $17.8 88 $202 $29.0 $88.4 19.40 $0.71 $1.16 18.70 $1.86 $3.54
1994 $8.9 137 $65 $25.5 117 $218 $33.3 $97.8 15.90 $0.69 $1.33 20.70 $2.23 $3.91
1995 $10.1 173 $59 $32.1 124 $259 $38.9 $116.9 49.30 $1.08 $1.56 32.20 $2.74 $4.68
1996 $11.5 161 $72 $37.8 128 $295 $45.4 $142.5 42.70 $1.19 $1.81 34.80 $3.36 $5.70
1997 $19.6 242 $81 $51.7 154 $336 $61.5 $184.7 33.10 $1.28 $2.46 26.80 $3.81 $7.39
1998 $30.0 289 $104 $79.1 206 $384 $89.5 $256.3 18.90 $1.52 $3.58 15.60 $4.41 $10.25
1999 $57.2 450 $127 $71.1 188 $378 $141.5 $315.0 188.80 $6.02 $5.66 71.30 $9.69 $12.60
2000 $107.4 639 $168 $86.8 193 $450 $244.9 $384.0 24.30 $3.69 $9.79 10.60 $7.14 $15.36
2001 $38.0 310 $123 $71.2 169 $421 $274.0 $429.7 -34.30 $4.90 $10.96 -20.60 $7.68 $17.19
2002 $9.2 198 $47 $47.7 166 $288 $273.0 $445.4 -29.50 $5.48 $10.92 -13.10 $8.59 $17.82
2003 $11.6 155 $75 $40.0 138 $290 $273.1 $447.6 6.80 $5.92 $10.92 18.20 $10.93 $17.91
2004 $18.8 206 $91 $65.3 177 $369 $272.3 $461.2 15.40 $6.51 $10.89 17.20 $10.88 $18.45
2005 $26.4 200 $132 $130.9 228 $574 $268.7 $513.0 14.10 $6.41 $10.75 21.40 $11.69 $20.52
This table reports annual capital commitments to, number of funds raised in, and average annual returns of Venture Capital (VC) and Private Equity (PE) from 1980 to 2005 using Thomson Financial's Venture Economics
database. Money under management is calculated as the sum of capital commitments over the last seven years including the current year. Estimated fees are calculated using the money under management at the beginning of
the year, average returns for the year, and assuming that all funds earn the average return.Table 4a: Top Hedge Fund Incomes in Millions of Dollars
Rank 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
1 750 1020 1500 750 1020 1500
2 510 670 1400 510 670 1400
3 500 550 840 500 550 840
4 420 450 550 420 450 550
5 350 420 500 350 420 500
6 350 305 425 350 305 425
7 300 300 400 300 300 400
8 230 240 400 230 240 400
9 150 225 340 150 225 340
10 146 205 275 146 205 275
11 135 195 230 135 195 230
12 128 180 215 128 180 215
13 125 153 210 125 153 210
14 120 125 200 120 125 200
15 110 125 200 110 125 200
16 110 125 200 110 125 200
17 100 120 190 100 120 190
18 95 115 175 95 115 175
19 95 115 160 95 115 160
20 92 110 150 92 110 150
21 80 110 150 80 110 150
22 80 110 150 80 110 145
23 75 102 150 75 102 —
24 70 100 145 70 100 —
25 65 100 130 65 100 —
Alpha Top Hedge Fund Managers (Global) Alpha Top Hedge Fund Managers (U.S. Only)
Source: Institutional Investor’s estimates of the incomes of the top 25 most highly compensated hedge fund managers
from 2003 to 2005.  The right panel presents only those hedge fund managers listed as based in the U.S.Table 4b: Top Financial Industry Incomes in Millions of Dollars
1988 1995
Rank 1988 in $2004 1995 in $2004 2003 2004 2005
1 190 283 1500 1777 750 1020 1500
2 120 179 350 415 510 670 1400
3 110 164 150 178 500 550 840
4 110 164 115 136 420 450 550
5 100 149 95 113 350 420 550
6 88 130 90 107 350 305 500
7 80 119 76 90 300 300 425
8 65 97 76 90 275 240 400
9 55 82 75 89 230 225 400
10 55 82 70 83 225 205 340
20 30 45 40 47 100 120 190
30 25 37 30 36 63 88 125
40 20 30 25 30 35 63 68
50 15 22 20 24 25 35 45
60 15 22 17 20 13 28 35
70 10 15 14 17 8 23 23
80 9 13 13 15 8 13 13
90 8 12 10 12 8 13 13
100 8 12 9 11 NA NA NA
Financial World Trader Monthly and Alpha
Financial World rankings include all financial industry individuals and employees, including private equity and hedge funds. Trader Monthly rankings include
traders and hedge fund professionals only, and Alpha rankings are for hedge fund professionals only. Alpha figures are released later and for this reason when
there is conflicting information about a given individual's earnings, Alpha numbers are used. Inflation adjustments for the counts of 1988 in $2004 and 1995 in
$2004 are performed using the GDP deflator.Table 5a:  Assets Under Management at Mutual Funds
Total Equity Hybrid Bond
Money 
Market Total Equity Hybrid Bond
Money 
Market
1980 $135 $44 $14 $76 564 288 170 106
1981 $241 $41 $14 $186 665 306 180 179
1982 $297 $54 $23 $220 857 340 199 318
1983 $293 $77 $37 $179 1,026 396 257 373
1984 $371 $80 $11 $46 $234 1,243 459 89 270 425
1985 $495 $111 $18 $123 $244 1,528 562 103 403 460
1986 $716 $154 $26 $243 $292 1,835 678 121 549 487
1987 $769 $175 $29 $248 $316 2,312 824 164 781 543
1988 $809 $189 $26 $256 $338 2,737 1,006 179 942 610
1989 $981 $245 $36 $272 $428 2,935 1,069 189 1,004 673
1990 $1,065 $239 $36 $291 $498 3,079 1,099 193 1,046 741
1991 $1,393 $405 $52 $394 $542 3,403 1,191 212 1,180 820
1992 $1,643 $514 $78 $504 $546 3,824 1,325 235 1,400 864
1993 $2,070 $741 $145 $619 $565 4,534 1,586 282 1,746 920
1994 $2,155 $853 $164 $527 $611 5,325 1,886 361 2,115 963
1995 $2,811 $1,249 $210 $599 $753 5,725 2,139 412 2,177 997
1996 $3,526 $1,726 $253 $645 $902 6,248 2,570 466 2,224 988
1997 $4,468 $2,368 $317 $724 $1,059 6,684 2,951 501 2,219 1,013
1998 $5,525 $2,978 $365 $831 $1,352 7,314 3,512 526 2,250 1,026
1999 $6,846 $4,042 $379 $812 $1,613 7,791 3,952 532 2,262 1,045
2000 $6,965 $3,962 $346 $811 $1,845 8,155 4,385 523 2,208 1,039
2001 $6,975 $3,418 $346 $925 $2,285 8,305 4,716 483 2,091 1,015
2002 $6,390 $2,662 $325 $1,130 $2,272 8,244 4,747 473 2,035 989
2003 $7,414 $3,684 $430 $1,248 $2,052 8,126 4,599 508 2,045 974
2004 $8,107 $4,384 $519 $1,290 $1,913 8,041 4,547 510 2,041 943
2005 $8,905 $4,940 $567 $1,357 $2,041 7,977 4,586 505 2,015 871
$ billions # of Funds
This table reports assets under management and number of funds for equity, hybrid and bond mutual funds from 1980 to 2005.  The source is the 2006 
Investment Company Institute Handbook.Table 5b: Fees at Mutual Funds
$ billions Fees Fees Fees Fees Fees
Total Preferred Asset  Asset  Fees Fees Fees $ Billions $ Billions $ Billions
Assets Common Weighted % Weighted % $ Billions $ Billions $ Billions in $2005 in $2005 in $2005
Year Stock Funds Bond Funds Stock Funds Bond Funds Total Stock Funds Bond Funds Total




















2000 $5,119 $3,910 1.28% 1.03% $50.7 $11.9 $62.6 $56.9 $13.4 $70.2
2001 $4,690 $3,424 1.24% 0.97% $42.4 $12.3 $54.7 $46.4 $13.5 $59.9
2002 $4,118 $2,688 1.24% 0.93% $33.0 $13.5 $46.6 $35.5 $14.6 $50.1
2003 $5,362 $3,760 1.22% 0.94% $44.9 $15.8 $60.7 $47.4 $16.6 $64.1
2004 $6,194 $4,490 1.17% 0.92% $51.3 $16.6 $67.9 $52.7 $17.1 $69.8
2005 $6,865 $5,054 1.13% 0.90% $55.8 $17.3 $73.1 $55.8 $17.3 $73.1
This table reports fees as a percentage of assets under management, dollars of fees, and dollars of fees in 2004 dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator for bond and equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2005.
Fees include loads and sales charges. The source is the 2006 Investment Company Institute Handbook.Table 6a: Statistics for Laywers at Top Firms
1984 Top 50 still
Top 50 in 1984 Top 50 in 1994 Top 50 in 2004 in  Top 100 in 2004 Top 100 in 1994 Top 100 in 2004 Top 200 in 2004
Revenues ($ millions) per firm $66.4 $209.5 $644.6 $611.9 $153.1 $460.4 $297.6
$61.5 $174.0 $573.0 $503.5 $124.5 $398.5 $199.5
Revenues ($ millions) per firm in 2004$ $106.8 $251.2 $644.6 $611.9 $183.6 $460.4 $297.6
$99.0 $208.6 $573.0 $503.5 $149.3 $398.5 $199.5
Lawyers per firm 258 469 889 830 371 682 471
230 401 808 661 330 597 361
Total number of lawyers all firms 13,150 23,463 44,473 37,329 37,098 68,186 94,214
Equity partners per firm 90 155 221 203 130 179 134
75 136 205 168 112 152 116
Total number of equity partners all firms 4,603 7,774 11,034 9,144 12,961 17,861 26,755
Profits per Equity Partner ($ millions) $0.309 $0.531 $1.260 $1.339 $0.450 $1.014 $0.828
$0.265 $0.460 $1.075 $1.116 $0.398 $0.855 $0.665
Top 0.5% in AGI $0.160 $0.286 $0.479 $0.479 $0.286 $0.479 $0.479
Top 0.1% in AGI $0.418 $0.733 $1.400 $1.400 $0.733 $1.400 $1.400
Profits per Equity Partner in 2004 $ ($ millions) $0.498 $0.636 $1.260 $1.339 $0.540 $1.014 $0.828
$0.427 $0.552 $1.075 $1.116 $0.477 $0.855 $0.665
Number of firms 51 50 50 45 100 100 200
This table reports revenues, lawyers, equity partners and profits per partner for law firms from the American Lawyer magazine, AmLaw top law firms for calendar years 1984, 1994, and 2004. In each cell,
average is reported above medians. When converted, 1984 and 1994 dollars are converted into 2004 dollars using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator. In 1984, we assume that all partners are equity partners, so
profits per equity partner equals profit per partner. In 1994, firms began to appoint non-equitypartners. The median firm had no non-equity partners. For 1994, we report the number of equity partners and profits
per all partners.  This sligtly understates true proifts per equity partner.  In 2004, ALM distinguished between profits per equity and total partners.Table 6b: Top Law Firm Equity Partners and AGI














Share of Bracket 
and Above
2004
$479,177 $1,400,370 661,925 >99.5 14,351 2.17% 18,597 2.81% 9,915 1.50%
$1,400,370 132,385 >99.9 3,165 2.39% 3,477 2.63% 2,708 2.05%
1994
$286,290 $733,602 579,715 >99.5 8,465 1.46% 5,233 0.90%
$733,602 115,943 >99.9 1,509 1.30% 1,130 0.97%
1984
$159,958 $417,846 534,355 >99.5 2,671 0.50%
$417,846 106,871 >99.9 1,132 1.06%
Estimated Am Law 200 Estimated Am Law 50 Estimated Am Law 100
This table estimates the number of equity partners at the Am Law top law firms in the top 0.5% and 0.1% AGI brackets in 1984, 1994, and 2004. For each law firm, the
estimates that 1/3 of the partners earn more than the average while 2/3 of the partners earn less than the average. The estimates assume that the most highly paid partner
earns twice the average while the least highly paid partner earns half the average.Table 6c: Top Law Firm Equity Partners and AGI Excluding Investment Income
Bottom of 














Share of Bracket 
and Above
2004
$404,912 $1,121,024 661,925 >99.5 15,802 2.39% 20,932 3.16% 10,514 1.59%
$1,121,024 132,385 >99.9 4,986 3.77% 5,607 4.24% 4,137 3.12%
1994
$243,593 $584,837 579,715 >99.5 9,879 1.70% 5,972 1.03%
$584,837 115,943 >99.9 2,679 2.31% 1,889 1.63%
Estimated Am Law 200 Estimated Am Law 50 Estimated Am Law 100
This table estimates the number of equity partners at the Am Law top law firms in the top 0.5% and 0.1% AGIbrackets in 1994, and 2004. For each law firm, the estimates that 1/3
of the partners earn more than the average while 2/3 of the partners earn less than the average. The estimates assume that the most highly paid partner earns twice the average while
the least highly paid partner earns half the average.Table 7: Professional Athletes and AGI








- $                        309,160.20 $           131,061,150     0-99 122 616 0 738 0.0% 0.0%
309,160.20 $           479,176.99 $           661,925            99-99.5 204 417 30 651 0.1% 0.2%
479,176.99 $           1,400,370.36 $        529,540            99.5-99.9 173 633 134 940 0.2% 0.3%
1,400,370.36 $        7,189,506.01 $        119,147            99.9-99.99 243 434 197 874 0.7% 0.8%
7,189,506.01 $        31,178,804.88 $      11,915              99.99-99.999 84 57 62 203 1.7% 1.5%
31,178,804.88 $      1,324                >99.999 0101 0.1% 0.1%
Mean ($M) $2.48 $1.24 $3.74 $1.85
Median ($M) $0.76 $0.54 $2.21 $0.64
Total Dollars ($M) $2,051 $2,681 $1,580 $6,312
1995
208,400.00 $           117,035,820     0-99 481 743 59 1283 0.0% 0.0%
208,400.00 $           310,900.00 $           591,090            99-99.5 95 221 19 335 0.1% 0.2%
310,900.00 $           820,222.24 $           472,872            99.5-99.9 155 473 68 696 0.1% 0.3%
820,222.24 $           3,658,000.00 $        106,396            99.9-99.99 163 401 214 778 0.7% 0.8%
3,658,000.00 $        14,957,428.35 $      10,640              99.99-99.999 91 5 18 114 1.1% 1.0%
14,957,428.35 $      1,182                >99.999 0000 0.0% 0.0%
Mean ($M) $0.96 $0.55 $1.42 $0.78
Median ($M) $0.22 $0.28 $1.11 $0.30
Total Dollars ($M) $950 $1,022 $535 $2,508
Excluding Investment Income
2004
- $                        270,600.78 $           131,061,150     0-99 0 493 0 493 0.0% 0.0%
270,600.78 $           404,912.28 $           661,925            99-99.5 308 481 30 819 0.1% 0.2%
404,912.28 $           1,121,024.07 $        529,540            99.5-99.9 169 606 117 892 0.2% 0.3%
1,121,024.07 $        5,143,664.32 $        119,147            99.9-99.99 215 473 168 856 0.7% 0.9%
5,143,664.32 $        19,778,205.17 $      11,915              99.99-99.999 132 104 106 342 2.9% 2.6%
19,778,205.17 $      1,324                >99.999 2125 0.4% 0.4%
1995
180,510.49 $           117,035,820     0-99 442 638 54 1134 0.0% 0.0%
180,510.49 $           264,890.00 $           591,090            99-99.5 95 254 18 367 0.1% 0.2%
264,890.00 $           644,044.51 $           472,872            99.5-99.9 149 411 35 595 0.1% 0.3%
644,044.51 $           2,539,830.20 $        106,396            99.9-99.99 158 497 201 856 0.8% 0.9%
2,539,830.20 $        9,524,042.85 $        10,640              99.99-99.999 141 43 70 254 2.4% 2.1%
9,524,042.85 $        1,182                >99.999 0000 0.0% 0.0%Table 8a: Top AGI Income Quantiles and Earnings of Top Individuals in Different Categories in 2004
in top 0.5% in top 0.1% in top 0.01% in top 0.001% in top 0.0001%
Total Tax Units in 2004 661,925 132,385 13,239 1,324 132
AGI Threshold $479,177 $1,400,370 $7,189,506 $31,178,805 $101,000,000
Non-Financial Top Executives in ExecuComp 6,320 3,415 591 67 3
Non-Financial Top Executives Non-ExecuComp (Estimated) 6,880 1,622 104 18 0
Total Main Street 13,200 5,037 695 85 3
Total Main Street as % of Bracket 1.99% 3.80% 5.25% 6.40% 2.27%
Financial Top Executives Total (Estimated) 546 351 102 15 0
Investment Bankers 10,000 6,900 1,482 13 0
Hedge Fund Investors 9,000 3,000 >100 60 26
VC Investors 6,000 1,200
PE Investors 5,400 2,160 >5 >5 3
Total Wall Street 30,946 13,611
Am Law 100 Law Partners 14,351 3,165
Total Wall Street + Law Partners 45,297 16,775
Professional Athletes 2,018 1,078 204 1 0
Top Celebrities >100 100 64 22 3
Total Estimated in Our Sample 60,615 22,990 2,652 201 35
Total in our Sample as % of Bracket 9.16% 17.37% 20.03% 15.18% 26.44%
This table uses the ExecuComp data and our estimates of the non-ExecuComp companies to populate the top brackets for executives of non-financial and financial
companies. It uses estimated 2004 brackets for the top 0.5%, 0.1%, 0.01%, and 0.001%, and it uses the 2001 AGI cutoff for the top 0.0001% bracket due to data
availability. It assumes the exponential-based estimates of the distribution of investment banker income. For hedge fund investors, the figures in the table assume an
average compensation of 3.2% of assets under management; that all 9,000 have AGI above $0.5 million (top 0.5%); and that 1/3 or 3,000 have AGI above $1.4 million
(top 0.1%). For the very top end of the hedge fund distribution, the figures rely on the numbers in Tables 4a and 4b, which are based on Trader Monthly and the II
Alpha 25. For VC investors, we assume an average compensation of 4.0% of assets under management; that all 6,000 partners have AGI above $0.5 million; and that
1/5 or 1,200 have AGI above $1.4 million. For PE investors, under the same 4.0% assumption, we assume that all 5,400 have AGI above $0.5 million and 2/5 or 2,160
have AGI above $1.4 million. For VC and PE, we do not try to make any assumptions for incomes above the top 0.01%. We use the distributions calculated earlier for
law partners and professional athletes.Table 8b: Dollars Earned over time by various sectors (in $billions)
1994 1984
2004 in $2004 in $2004 1994 1984
Group 1: Main Street
AGI of Non-Financial Top Executives in ExecuComp $22.0 $8.4 $7.0
AGI of Non-Financial Top Executives, not in ExecuComp $12.0 $4.5 $3.7
Total Main Street $34.0 $12.9 $10.7
Group 2: Wall Street, Including Lawyers
AGI of Financial Top Executives in ExecuComp $2.9 $1.2 $1.0
AGI Investment Bankers (10,000 on Exponential Distribution) $28.4
Fees to Hedge Fund Investors $25.4 $3.8 $1.1 $3.2 $0.7
Fees to VC Investors $10.9 $1.6 $0.8 $1.3 $0.5
Fees to PE Investors $18.4 $4.7 $0.4 $3.9 $0.2
Profits to Am Law 100 Law Partners $18.1 $7.1 $4.6 $5.8 $2.8
Fees to Mutual Fund Investors $69.8 $36.8 $8.0 $31.1 $5.1
Total Wall Street, Including Lawyers $174.0
Group 3: Other Public Figures
AGI to Professional Athletes $6.3 $3.0 $2.5
AGI to Celebrities $2.5
Total Other Public Figures $8.8
The table summarizes the dollar amounts of AGI and fees of the various groups and how they have changed over time. 1984 Hedge funds use 1986 estimates. 1994
Professional Athletes use 1995 estimates. 1994 and 1984 mutual funds use 1995 and 1985 estimates. 1984 Am Law 100 estimated as two times 1984 Am Law 50
Partners. AGI to investment bankers for 2004 comes from the assumptions in Table 2b; for 1984 we scale the 2004 value down by the ratio of 1987 capital per
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